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A key puzzle persists in party politics: Why do legislators defect from a dominant 
party? A dominant party is the only party that offers legislators with office benefits in a 
dominant party system hence why would legislators leave the party for a less certain 
political future. The extant party defection literature uses individual legislator as the unit 
of analysis to explain party defection but this largely ignores the strategic context 
legislators’ decisions. 
With a fresh theoretical framework of nested games and faction as the unit of 
analysis, this thesis forms a game theoretic model to explain factional defection from a 
dominant party. The model focuses on the factions’ interdependent strategic choices in 
the inter-party arena and the intra-party arenas. It highlights factional defection in the 
strategic context of previously ignored parliamentary institutions, the no-confidence 
motion and the prime ministerial election. This thesis argues that factional defection from 
a dominant party occurs if the key factions are marginalized in the inter-factional 
coalition game within the intra-party arena, and if they expect to win the future inter-
party coalition game within the inter-party arena by forming a new ruling government 
with the opposition parties. 
This thesis has four main theoretical contributions. First, it improves the 
analytical framework of party defection by differentiating the types of party defection. 
This thesis forms a typology that classifies party defection according to either the nature 
of the defected group’s mother party, the defected group’s size, or the defected group’s 
party affiliation strategy. Second, this thesis explains factional defection that causes a 




intra-party factors), this thesis’ approach differs from existing explanations’ focus on 
macro-level factors. Third, this thesis forms a model to integrate the inter-party coalition 
dynamics (the focus of the coalition literature) and the intra-party coalition dynamics (the 
focus of the party defection literature). It shows that factions are dynamic strategic actors 
constantly trying to improve their strategic position simultaneously in terms of the inter-
factional coalition politics in the intra-party arena and the inter-party coalition politics in 
the inter-party arena. Fourth, this thesis gives a fresh perspective of Japanese politics by 
arguing that the sustenance of the LDP’s dominance was due to two main factors that lie 
in the party politics arena: the LDP’s capability to manage intra-party factional 
competition by preventing any key faction from been marginalized, and the inherent 
coordination failure between the opposition parties and the dominant party’s dissident 
elements in the prime ministerial election. These findings provide more specific 
predictive conditions for the sustenance of the LDP’s dominance than the extant literature.  
This thesis uses the analytic narrative approach with empirical analysis of four 
cases from post-war Japan (1945-2003). Japan was chosen because it has a factionalized 
dominant party that dominated Japanese politics for 58 years. The case comparison of 
four different no-confidence motions in the context of factional defection from the 
dominant party suggests the model’s usefulness and provides new insights into these 
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Chapter 1      Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The Puzzle: Why Defect from a Dominant Party? 
 
In 1980 and 1993, Japan’s dominant party, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(hereafter, LDP), experienced intense factional crises. Nevertheless, factional defection 
did not occur in 1980 when the dominant party faced the impending loss of power, but in 
1993 when it held a safe legislative majority.1  Legislators defect from a party in a 
situation when the gains of defection are higher than the costs by remaining within the 
dominant party. 2  In these two cases, one would have expected legislators to defect from 
a waning party in 1980, but instead legislators defected in 1993 from a dominant party 
that seemed able to hold the reins of power in the foreseeable future. 
This thesis answers a puzzle: why do legislators defect from a dominant party?3 
The extant literature’s electoral-based view of legislators argues that party labels are 
important for the re-election of legislators. Thus, why would a legislator defect from a 
dominant party and face the uncertainties of a new party label? Why does a group of 
legislators leave a dominant party, which holds a majority in the legislature to form a new 
party despite huge organizational obstacles; or join another party whereby they will be 
disadvantaged when rebuilding their own power network? In short, why do legislators 
defect despite the high political costs? If legislators defect, they will face an uncertain 
political future. Their power bases will be weakened, their political networks in the 
                                                 
1 LDP held 48.5 percent Lower House seat share in May 1980 as compared with 53.7 percent Lower House 
seat share in June 1993. 
2 A dominant party is defined as one where “it could find a pair of mutually exclusive coalitions, C1 and C2 
such that it could form a majority with either C1 or C2 but C1 and C2 could not form a majority between 
them”  (Laver and Kato 2003, 122). For other dominant party definitions, see Sartori (1976) and Pempel 
(1990). 
3 Party defection has been coined in terms most commonly as “exit” (e.g., Kato 1998) and other phrases 




mother party will be destroyed, and they will have to rebuild new political networks in 
the new parties (Cox et al. 1999; Reiter 2004, 255).  
This puzzle is also observed by moving up from the individual level of analysis to 
the party level of analysis. Most party defections originate either from the opposition 
parties or from a waning ruling party. The explanations for party defection from both 
types of parties are simple and intuitive. Legislators have minimum incentive to remain in 
an opposition party that does not provide them with office benefits (e.g., cabinet posts) or 
to remain in a waning ruling party that in the foreseeable future will not provide them 
with office benefits. The phenomenon that is harder to explain is dominant party 
defection because a dominant party holds a Lower House majority such that no 
alternative viable ruling inter-party coalition can be formed without it. Accordingly, why 
does party defection occur from a dominant party? This thesis seeks to answer this key 
puzzle. 
Despite being an important puzzle, there is no theory that explains party defection 
from a dominant party in the vast dominant party literature and the party defection 
literature. Unlike the extant literature which does not differentiate party defection, this 
thesis narrows the research focus to a important but understudied aspect of party 
defection – factional defection from a dominant party in established democracies. By 
building on the findings of Horiuchi and Tay (2004), this thesis uses the fresh approach 
of nested games and the novel unit of analysis, faction, to form a game theoretic model 
that explains factional defection. This thesis argues that factional defection from a 
dominant party occurs if key factions are marginalized in the inter-factional coalition 




coalition game within the inter-party arena by forming a new ruling government with the 
opposition parties. 
 
1.2 The Dual Coalition Dynamics in the Inter-party and Intra-party 
Arenas 
 “Every government is a coalition government, if it is not a coalition of different 
parties, then [it] is at least a coalition of factions within the single governing party” 
(Laver 1999, 9). Accordingly, in any form of coalition formation and coalition 
termination, the strategic interactions between political actors (e.g., political parties, 
factions, and legislators) operate simultaneously in the inter-party arena and the intra-
party arena. A dual coalition dynamics operate simultaneously in these two arenas: the 
inter-party coalition dynamics between parties in the inter-party arena and the inter-
factional coalition dynamics between factions in the intra-party arena. The party president 
is the leader of the party and in order for her to remain in power, the party president’s 
faction seeks to form and maintain two kinds of winning coalitions simultaneously: a 
winning inter-party coalition in the inter-party arena to control the government and a 
winning intra-party factional coalition within this inter-party coalition to win control of 
the party. 
The political actors (factions and parties) are dynamic strategic actors, which are 
engaged in repeated bargaining situations with long bargaining horizons. A faction’s 
primary goal in the party is to form a temporary inter-factional coalition within the party. 
The temporary winning inter-factional coalition within the intra-party arena is the 




factional coalition within the intra-party arena is the anti-mainstream factional coalition 
(hereafter, AMFC).4 Similarly, a party’s primary goal within a legislature is to form a 
temporary winning inter-party coalition within the legislature. The temporary winning 
inter-party coalition within the inter-party arena is the ruling party while the temporary 
losing inter-party coalition within the inter-party arena is the opposition parties. The 
coalition of factions is formed based on expediency. The losers of the present round of 
the inter-party coalition building, the opposition parties, constantly seek to replace the 
existing winning inter-party coalition, the ruling party; while the loser of the intra-party 
factional coalition building, the AMFC, constantly seek to replace the winning intra-party 
factional coalition, the MFC. The winner of the present round of inter-party coalition, the 
ruling party, and the winner of the intra-party factional coalition, the MFC, seeks to 
maintain their status as winners in both arenas simultaneously. As shown in figure 1-1, 
faction A, faction B, and faction C form the MFC while faction D and faction E form the 
AMFC in the ruling party. Factions also occur in opposition parties like faction W, 








                                                 
4 There is also a third group, the neutralist factions, which can support either side but the MFC and the 
AMFC play the most important role in intra-party politics. There are many ways to classify factional 






The dominant party’s dual coalition dynamics differs slightly from a normal 
party’s coalition dynamics in that the intra-party arena is more important than the inter-
party arena. This is because the dominant party is dominant in the inter-party arena with 
no viable opposition and it dominates the various dimensions of political life in a country, 
that is, the executive arena and that legislative arena. Consequently, the MFC’s continued 
dominance in the intra-party arena will automatically translates into dominance in the 
inter-party arena. Specifically, in the intra-party arena, the MFC’s continued control of 
the party presidency ensures its dominance in the intra-party decision-making mechanism 
thereby securing a disproportionate share of office benefits.5 In the inter-party arena, the 
MFC’s continued control of the dominant party entails it to win the post of prime 
                                                 
5 For instance, in Japan’s LDP, the MFC had a consistent advantage in controlling LDP endorsements 
hence mainstream factions were more electorally successful than anti-mainstream factions (Browne and 
Kim 2003; Cox and Rosenbluth 1993, 1996). Moreover, they also had the control of party funds, which are 
essential to the smooth everyday functioning of factions.  




























minister. The dominant party, by virtue of its large seat share, allows it to win the prime 
ministerial election easily in the legislature. By securing the prime ministerial post, the 
MFC will influence greatly the cabinet post distribution as the prime minister has a great 
influence on the choice of cabinet ministers. This in turn ensures that the MFC secures 
most of the cabinet members. Consequently, the MFC’s continued ability to secure office 
benefits in the intra-party arena (party posts) and in the inter-party arena (cabinet and 
legislative posts) will increase the survivability of the AMFC’s factions as it has more 
posts to distribute to its factional members unlike the AMFC.6  
 
1.3   Significance: Depicting a more Realistic Picture of Party 
Defection, Dominant Party Split, Coalition Politics, and 
Japanese Politics    
This thesis’ key focus of is factional defection, a topic, which has not been 
explicitly and systematically dealt with in the literature (except Horiuchi and Tay 2004). 
Factional defection is a type of party defection and party defection is not a rare 
phenomenon and occurs widely in different party systems, ranging from party systems 
with infrequent party defections like in U.S. whereby only 20 legislators defected 
between 1947 and 1997, to party systems with frequent party defections like in Brazil 
where over one-third of the legislators defected between 1986 and 1990 (Mershon and 
                                                 
6 The other key role of factions is the distribution of political resources, like the distribution of political 
funds, party and parliamentary posts, information, and party endorsements during elections. In addition, 





Heller 2003, 4). 7 By assuming that party defection is a rational phenomenon, this thesis 
contributes to four strands of literature. 
1.3.1 A Typology of Party Defection  
This thesis improves the extant party defection literature’s analytical framework 
by differentiating party defections and providing a model for the explanation of a specific 
type of party defection – factional defection from a dominant party. This is significant 
because party defections occur in different forms, each motivated by different sets of 
motivations. Moreover, each type of party defection has different impact on the party 
system. Nevertheless, the extant literature analyzes the different types of party defection 
together thereby misses the fundamental differences between the various types of party 
defections.  
This thesis argues that party defection occurs in many forms hence should be 
analyzed differently. It forms a typology of party defection to provide a clear conceptual 
basis for empirical analysis (figure 1-2). At the first level, there are two categories based 
on the nature of the defectors’ mother party, the ruling party and the opposition party. 
Next, at the second level, there are three categories based on the organizational size of the 
defectors, factional defection (“Faction”), group defection (“Group”), and individual 
defection (“IDV”).8 Finally, at the third level, there are two categories based on the 
                                                 
7 The extant literature on party defection covers party defection in a wide range of party system. For 
instance, in two-party systems like the United States (Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Castle and Fett 2000; 
Mayhew 1966; Nokken 2000), Canada (Garner and Letki 2005) and the United Kingdom (Denver and 
Bochel 1994; Kam 2002; Norton 1978); multi-party systems like Russia (Smith and Remington 2001), 
Spain (Mershon and Heller 2003), Brazil (Ames 2002; Mainwarring and Perez Linan 1997), the Baltic and 
East European nations (Grofman et al. 2000; Kreuzer and Pettai 2003; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004; 
Thames 2005), and Thailand (Chambers 2003; Harker 2003); and in dominant party systems like pre-1994 
Japan (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995; Kato 1998; Kohno 1997; Reed and Scheiner 2003; Tatebayashi 2002), 
pre-1993 Italy (Boucek 2002; Heller and Mershon 2005), and pre-2000 Mexico (Langston 2002). 
8 Factional defection is “the defection of a faction which, after defection, can significantly tilt the balance 




nature of the party where the defectors defect to, fission (“FIS”) and party switch 
(“PSW”).9  There are fundamental differences between these different types of party 
defection hence each category warrants different analytical approaches. This thesis 
focuses on the factional defection from a ruling party, specifically the dominant party, as 




1.3.2 Factional Defection and Dominant Party Split   
This thesis systematically explains factional defection from a dominant party. 
This is significant because one of the main reasons for a major dominant party split and 
its eventual loss of power is factional defection. A factional defection is carried out by a 
sizeable number of dominant party legislators hence the defecting faction will have the 
critical size to deprive the dominant party of its ruling majority and participate in an 
                                                                                                                                                 
“the defection of a small sub-faction or cross-factional group which even after defection does not 
significantly tilt the balance of the inter-party power balance” (ibid.). The third type is individual defection,  
that is, the “isolated cases of defection by individual legislators” (ibid.). 
9 Fission is a “collective reaffiliation strategy in which a minority group of politicians breaks away from an 
established party to form a new party (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003, 79). “Party switching occurs when a 
politician reaffiliates with another existing party. Both exit and entry parties have to been in existence for at 
least one election prior to the switch (ibid., 78).” 
Figure 1-2. Typology of Party Defection 
PSW FIS 
Faction IDVGroup 








alternative ruling coalition. Consequently, only factional defection from a dominant party 
matters vis-à-vis the other types of party defection because this type of defection, not the 
numerous defections from opposition parties or the small group defections from the 
dominant party, can cause fundamental changes in a dominant party system. 
A few important dominant parties that dominated the political landscapes of their 
country for decades lost power in the last twenty years. For instance, Italy’s Christian 
Democrat Party (DC) in 1992, Japan’s LDP in 1993, Indonesia’s Golongan Karya 
(Golkar) in 1999, Mexico’s Partido Revoluncionario Institucional (PRI) in 2000, and 
Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) in 2000. One-party dominance is likely to continue 
because the dominant party devises institutions and implements policies to ensure the 
sustenance of its one party dominance. Despite this “virtuous cycle of dominance”, why 
does a dominant party eventually lose power (Pempel 1990, 16)? There are two possible 
causes: either the dominant party’s loss of power through defeat in the national level 
elections prior to the party split or a party split followed by the subsequent loss of power 
at the national level elections. The former is easily explained by macro-level factors and 
is intuitive because the groups of legislators are deserting a waning dominant party. The 
latter presents a puzzle. Why do legislators defect from the party that still hold the reins 
of power and which will most likely continue to hold the reins of power in the 
foreseeable future?  
This thesis seeks to answer this puzzle, which the extant literature does not 
answer completely. On the one hand, the bulk of the extant literature that focuses on the 
macro-level factors in the inter-party arena fails to explain the dominant party’s loss of 




defection and which particular faction defect.10 On the other hand, the few works that 
focuses on the factors within the dominant party’s intra-party arena also fail to explain 
the dominant party split systematically (e.g., Boucek 2003; Bettcher 2001; Solinger 2001). 
Such works attribute the dominant parties’ loss of power to the dominant parties’ internal 
malaise. These works argue that the dominant party’s long term dominance will result in 
a rigid factional structure thereby making the dominant party less responsive to the 
increasingly competitive political environment. Consequently, the dominant party losses 
power. 
In short, unlike this thesis, these two strands of literature cannot identify the 
timing of dominant party collapse. This thesis’ main premise is that the more important 
mechanisms lie within the party system, specifically, in the inter-party arena and the 
dominant party’s intra-party arena. Therefore, this thesis argues that a combination of 
intra-party and inter-party factors cause factional defection from the dominant party 
thereby causing the dominant party’s loss of power. This thesis forms a model to explain 
factional defection from a dominant party. Although, this explanation is not novel, 
existing studies have not formally integrate both perspectives in a coherent model (e.g., 
Norris 1995; Philip 2002, 137-9; Tan 2002, 154-9). Specifically, with the model, this 
thesis argues that factional defection from a dominant party occurs when key factions are 
marginalized in the inter-factional coalition game within the intra-party arena, and if they 
expect to win the future inter-party coalition game within the inter-party arena by 
forming a new ruling government with the opposition parties. 
                                                 
10 The macro-level factors include ideological shifts (Inoguchi 1993, 445-6; Ōtake 1996; Sasaki 1999), 
historical consequence of democratization (Flanagan and Lee 2000; Giliomee and Simkins 1999), party 
system changes (Boucek 1998), voter realignment caused by public distrust of the government (Reed 1999; 
Saitō 1996), the historical changes socioeconomic composition of the party’s support base (Pempel 1998), 




1.3.3 A Model of Inter-party and Intra-party Coalition Dynamics 
Based on the premise that factions are constantly on the lookout for strategic 
opportunities to improve their position within the inter-party and intra-party arenas, this 
thesis forms a model to address the theoretical gap between the party defection literature 
(e.g., Castle and Fett 2000) and the coalition politics literature (e.g., Grofman and 
Roozendaal 1997; Laver 1998, 2003). 11 This is significant because “one of the biggest 
unclaimed prizes” in the coalition politics literature is to form a dynamic approach that 
can factor in the intra-party politics to explain coalition formation and coalition 
termination (Laver 1998, 22).  
The main weakness of the existing studies is that both the party defection 
literature and the coalition politics literature do not link the political actors’ strategic 
calculations in the intra-party and the inter-party arena. The party defection literature 
focuses on either the political actors’ strategic calculations in the intra-party arena by 
(e.g., Boucek 2003, 2005; Bouissou 2001) while the coalition politics literature focuses 
on the political actors’ strategic calculations in the inter-party arena (e.g., Grofman and 
van Roozendal 1999), without linking both arenas. Consequently, these two strands of 
literature have portrayed a static view of the political actors (parties, factions, intra-party 
groups and legislators). On the one hand, the extant party defection literature, with the 
individual legislator as the unit of analysis, analyzes party defection (also known as exit) 
with voice in the intra-party arena.12 It does not link with the greater context of coalition 
                                                 
11 The inter-party coalition dynamics has been explained extensively in the existing coalition politics 
literature in terms of coalition formation (Huber 1996; Lupia and Strom 1995) and coalition termination 
(Grofman and van Roozendaal 1997; Warwick 1994). Works on intra-party coalition dynamics are far 
fewer (e.g., Leiserson 1968).   
12 The concept of exit and voice comes from Hirschman’s (1970) “Exit, voice and loyalty” framework. 




politics as it focuses only on whether an individual legislator with a particular 
characteristic will defect or not defect. 13  This ignores the legislators’ strategic 
calculations in the inter-party arenas and intra-party arenas. On the other hand, the 
coalition literature, with the unitary party as the unit of analysis, focuses only on the 
inter-party coalition politics in the inter-party arena without linking to the factional 
coalition politics within the intra-party arena. This overlooks the key political dynamics 
of intra-party bargaining which determines the consequences of inter-party coalition 
bargaining.  
This weakness is exemplified by the Democratic Party’s puzzling seat share 
decline in the late 1940s and the LDP’s seat share increase in the late 1990s. Both parties 
experienced seat share changes without undergoing any election. Despite being the 
pivotal party in the ruling coalition, the Democratic Party lost 28.5 percent of its Lower 
House seat share within a span of 16 months due to party defections (March 1947-
October 1948).14 Conversely, the LDP gained 13.4 percent of Lower House seat share 
between the 1996 Lower House election and the 2000 Lower House election by 
absorbing defectors from other parties.15 Both the existing coalition literature and party 
defection literature cannot adequately explain such a phenomenon, by assuming that 
political actors are static (except Laver and Benoit 2003; Gianneti and Laver 2004; Kato 
and Yamamoto 2005). 
                                                                                                                                                 
voice as intra-party protests and exit as party defection in the analysis of the LDP and the Japan Socialist 
Party break up. 
13 For instance, such works argue that an electorally strong legislator will be more likely to defect than an 
electorally weak legislator will. 
14 Furthermore, it performed badly in the 1949 Lower House election that further reduced its Lower House 
seat share to 14.8 percent. Consequently, because of intra-party conflicts, it split into two entities with the 
mother party being reduced to a size of 7.9 percent Lower House seat share while the other half merged 
with the Liberal Party. 
15 The LDP’s seats increased from 239 seats in the 1996 Lower House election to 271 seats just before the 




To improve on these two literatures, this thesis forms a game theoretic model to 
link these two literatures to show the interdependence of the actors’ strategic calculations 
in the inter-party arena and the inter-party arena. This thesis argues that factions within 
the dominant party interacts with the political actors in the intra-party and inter-party 
arenas – always on a delicate balance between staying put within the party and defecting 
from the party. A faction’s decision to defect is based on the balance between the 
political costs and the political benefits in the two arenas simultaneously – the inter-party 
coalition building in the inter-party arena (within the legislature) and the intra-party 
coalition building in the intra-party arena (within parties). Thus, party defection is a 
strategic decision based on the strategic calculations at the point in time.  
1.3.4 Japanese Politics: Alternative Explanation of the LDP’s 
Sustenance of Dominance   
This thesis provides systematic explanation for the sustenance of the LDP’s one 
party dominance with a model. The model provides more specific predictive conditions 
for the sustenance of the LDP’s one party dominance than the extant literature. By 
focusing on the inter-party and the intra-party arenas, this thesis argues that the 
sustenance of the LDP’s dominance is due to two key factors: the LDP’s ability to 
manage intra-party factional competition by preventing any key faction from been 
marginalized, and the opposition parties’ inability to overcome the inherent coordination 
failure in the prime ministerial election.  
The extant literature explains the sustenance of the LDP’s dominance due either 
to the LDP strength or the opposition party weaknesses. On the one hand, the LDP 




(Ōtake 1986), its broad socio-economic support (Calder 1988, 26; Curtis 1988, 48), to its 
adaptation to the electoral system (Browne and Kim 2003). On the other hand, the 
opposition party weaknesses have been attributed to ideological inflexibility and their 
divisiveness (Ishikawa and Hirose 1989, 3-4, 57-60; Satō and Matsuzaki 1986, 17-23), 
in-capability in ruling the country (Sims 2001, 339-342), and organizational factors 
(Johnson 2000). Nevertheless, no work has integrated the two perspectives into a formal 
model as what this thesis has done. This thesis forms a model that integrates LDP 
strength and opposition party weaknesses to explain the sustenance of LDP dominance. 
In short, this thesis argues that the LDP’s key strength is its capability to manage intra-
party factional competition by preventing any key faction from been marginalized. This 
gives the key factions longer bargaining horizons. In addition, this thesis argues that the 
opposition parties’ key weaknesses is the inherent coordination failure, within and among 
the opposition parties, between the opposition parties, and the dominant party’s dissident 
elements in the prime ministerial election. The heart of the coordination failure between 
opposition parties as frequently cited in the party politics literature is more of their 
coordination failure to nominate a single prime ministerial candidate rather than their 
failure to form an alternative feasible ruling coalition to the dominant party (c.f. 
Christensen 2000; Johnson 2000). 
 
1.4 Synopsis of Chapters 
This thesis aims to give a better model to analyze party defection in Japan. This 
thesis uses the analytic narrative approach that entails the building of models and testing 




from Japan suggests the usefulness of the model. This chapter began by raising the key 
puzzle of factional defection from a dominant party. It then lists the four main 
contributions of the thesis: improving the analytical framework of party defection by 
differentiating party defection; explaining factional defection that cause a dominant party 
loss of power by forming a model to integrate the inter-party coalition dynamics (the 
focus of the coalition literature) and the intra-party coalition dynamics (the focus of the 
party defection literature); giving a fresh perspective of the sustenance of the LDP’s 
dominance. Chapter 2 proceeds to give a brief literature review of the existing party 
defection literature that uses the individual legislator as the unit of analysis and the 
dominant party literature that uses party as the unit of analysis. Subsequently, it explains 
why the faction is a better unit of analysis than the individual legislator and the party. The 
game theoretic model for factional defection is then explained by stating the assumptions, 
the actors, the institutional constraints, and the strategic choices made by the actors. This 
model predicts the conditions under which factional defection will occur by focusing on 
the interdependent strategic calculations of party defection in the inter-party and the intra-
party arenas. Chapter 3 explains the research design and the empirical validation. The 
chapter begins by describing the thesis’ research design. The research design centers on 
the ways to overcome the conceptual challenges in explaining rare events like factional 
defection from a dominant party. It explains the criterion for the relevant cases (the 
positive cases and the negative cases) and the irrelevant cases in details follow by 
discussing the operationalization of the propositions derived from the model. The 
propositions are then tested with narratives from four cases. The novel approach of case 




interesting insights into Japanese politics. Finally, I conclude by discussing the model’s 




Chapter 2     Theories 
 
This chapter covers the analytic part of this thesis by setting forth the parameters 
for research design and empirical validation in chapter 3. The chapter begins by 
providing an overall literature review of the extant party defection literature by 
explaining its failure to differentiate party defection, highlighting the main weaknesses of 
the use of individual legislator as unit of analysis, and the use of party as unit of analysis. 
Section 2.2 explains the choice of the model in terms of faction as the unit of analysis, 
game theory as the theoretical approach, and nested games as the theoretical model for 
factional defection. This section then explains the strategic utility of the prime ministerial 
election and the no-confidence motion for the opposition parties and the dominant party’s 
dissident elements. Next, section 2.3 introduces the game theoretic model developed by 
Horiuchi and Tay (2004) by explaining the strategic interactions between the MFC and 
the AMFC in two sets of dual coalition dynamics in the inter-party and intra-party arenas. 
Subsequently, three propositions are derived. 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
This thesis explains a specific type of party defection, factional defection from a 
dominant party. The extant literature falls into two main streams: the party defection 
literature that uses the individual legislator as the unit of analysis and the party defection 
literature that uses the political party as the unit of analysis. The former assumes that 
legislators who defect from a party make rational decisions resulting from individual 




causes of party defection to the macro-level factors. Consequently, there are three main 
weaknesses in these two literatures. First, both literatures do not differentiate party 
defection; second, the literature that uses the individual legislator as the unit of analysis 
cannot account for the causal mechanisms and the group incentive of party defection; 
third, the literature that uses the political party as the unit of analysis does not highlight 
the intra-party factors in the party politics arenas. 
2.1.1 The Failure to Differentiate Party Defection 
With the exception of a few works (e.g., Horiuchi and Tay 2004), the extant 
literature does not explicitly differentiate party defection. Contrary to the extant literature, 
this thesis differentiates party defection because different types of party defection arise 
from different incentive structure. There are three levels of differentiation in terms of the 
type of defecting faction’s mother party, the size of the defecting faction, and the end 
state of the defecting faction. Only Maeda (2005) deals explicitly with the first level of 
differentiation while only a few party defection works deal with the second and third 
level differentiation (e.g., Mershon and Heller 2003, 11; Turan 1985). 1 Although the 
majority of the party defection works analyze party defection based on the premise that 
individual legislators defect independently, it is not the same as the individual defection 
defined in the typology developed by this thesis (see figure 1-2). This thesis define 
individual defection as “isolated cases of defection by individual legislators” (Horiuchi 
and Tay 2004, 4). The typology differentiates party defection cases into three levels: the 
nature of the defectors’ mother party, the organizational size of the defectors, and the 
nature of the party where the defectors defect (see figure 1-2). 
                                                 
1 Mershon and Heller (2003) and Turan (1985) only differentiate party defection into two types, individual 




At the first level of differentiation, there are two categories based on the nature of 
the defectors’ mother party: the ruling party or the opposition party. Legislators from 
both types of parties face different incentives to defect. A ruling party legislator has a 
higher chance of securing office benefits than an opposition party legislator hence a 
ruling party legislator is less likely to defect than an opposition party legislator. This is 
because a ruling party controls the government thereby giving it access to majority of the 
office benefits. Consequently, the probability of a ruling party legislator receiving some 
form of office benefit is much higher than an opposition party legislator. This means that 
the loss of political incentives (e.g., access to office benefits) is much higher than the 
opposition party legislator.2 Despite this intuitive difference, the extant literature does not 
differentiate between these two types of party defection. 
At the second level of differentiation, there are three main categories based on the 
organizational size of the defectors: factional defection, group defection, and individual 
defection. In other words, a legislator can choose to defect alone (individual defection), 
defect with a group (group defection), or defect with a faction (factional defection).3 Such 
a differentiation is important because the group’s collective incentive (group incentive) is 
an essential part of a legislator’s strategic calculations when he or she contemplates party 
defection. The majority of the extant party defection literature analyzes all party 
                                                 
2 A ruling party legislator is more likely to enjoy higher chances of re-election because the label of the 
ruling party will provide him with a better advantage than an opposition party legislator. For instance, the 
ruling party is better able to channel resources to its legislator to build up support networks. 
3 Examples of individual party defection include defections in the US Congress and the post-1993 defection 
from LDP after the formation of the non-LDP ruling coalition in July 1993. Examples of group defection 
include the Kōno group defection from Japan’s LDP in 1976 to form the New Liberal Club, a group 
defection from Mexico’s PRI in 1963, and the group defection of legislators from UK’s Labor Party in 
1981 to form the Social Democratic Party. Examples of factional defection include the India’s Janata Dal 
factional defection from the National Front in 1990, South Korea’s pro-Roh Moo Hyun factional defection 
from Millennium Democratic Party to form the People’s Participatory Party in 2003, Taiwan’s Hau 
factional defection from the Kuomintang to form the Chinese New Party in 1993, and the Mexico’s 




defections as individual legislator defection. The assumption is that the legislator’s 
strategic choice to defect is based on the legislator’s personal ambition or idiosyncratic 
reasons. Nevertheless, this does not give a realistic picture of party defection because the 
group incentive is ignored in such analyses. Furthermore, this differentiation is 
significant because of the differential impact of such party defections. Factional defection 
and group defection have a higher probability of creating a change in the balance of 
power within the legislature than ad hoc defection of individual legislators because of the 
greater size. Extending from this logic, a defecting faction has a stronger bargaining 
power than a defecting group because of its larger size. In post-war Japan, based on the 
cases from the conservative parties in Japan, the frequency of group defection is higher 
than that of factional defection but more legislators defected in the form of factional 
defection than in the form of group defection (except the period of July 1993 to July 2003) 
(see table 2-1). There were six cases of factional defection and eleven cases of group 
defection but the number of defectors via the mode of factional defection was 157 and 88 
via the mode of group defection from 1945 to 2003. Such different types of party 






                                                 
4 These three kinds of defection can also occur together. In June 1993, there were three groups of defectors 
from the LDP: factional defection by the Hata faction, group defection by the Takemura group, and 




Table 2-1. Trend of Legislator Party Defection from the Conservative Parties 5 
Period Group Defection  Factional Defection 
No. of defectors  
Immediate post-war Period (October 1945-November 1955) 52 104 
One-party Dominant System (December 1955- June1993) 16 35 
Coalition Politics Period (July 1993- July 2003) 20 18 
Total : 88 157 
  
Frequency of cases 6  
Immediate post-war Period (October 1945-November 1955) 6 4 
One-party Dominant System (December 1955- June1993) 2 1 
Coalition Politics Period (July 1993- July 2003) 3 1 
Total: 11 6 
Source: Various issue of Kokkai Binran. 
 
At the third level, there are two categories based on the nature of the party where 
the defectors defect to: fission or party switch. This differentiation is important because it 
largely determines the political fates of the defecting legislators. For instance, it is much 
more risky to form a new party (fission) than to join another political party (party switch) 
because if a group or faction forms a new party, they may need to build up the new 
party’s organizational framework, support bases and political networks. This aspect of 
party defection has been ignored by the extant literature because it focuses only on 
individual defection whereby the style of party affiliation has only been party switching 
(except Kruezer and Pettai 2003). On the one hand, while it is possible for individual 
legislator to switch to another party, it is impossible for a legislator to form a new party. 
On the other hand, factions or groups can switch to another party or to form a new party. 
Because of this failure to differentiate, the extant literature’s has focus only on party 
switching. For instance, Laver and Benoit (2003) analyzes party switching by focusing on 
the incentive structure for both the party switchers and the party that is willing to accept 
                                                 
5 Conservative parties refer to Liberal Party and Democratic Party in the 1945-1955 period, and the LDP in 
the 1955-2003 period.  




these party switchers. Their analysis is flawed fundamentally, as they assumed that if 
legislators defect from party, they always join another party, that is, party switching. 
Fission, whereby legislators leave the party as a group or faction to form a new party also 
occurs in many cases. Theoretically, a faction or a group can either defect to another 
party (party switch) or form a new party (fission). As shown by the Japanese context, 
there were no cases of factional party switching and only two cases of group switching in 
Japan from 1945 to 2003 (table 2-2). It seems that despite the difficulties of forming new 
parties, if intra-party factions defect from the conservative parties, the factions form a 
new party.  
 
Table 2-2. Party Defection Matrix of Affiliation Strategy and Organizational Size in Japan (1945-2003)7 
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2.1.2 The Problems of Individual Legislators as the Unit of 
Analysis 
The extant party defection literature’s individual legislator as the unit of analysis 
cannot depict the causal mechanism of factional defection. These works cannot explain 
                                                 




the strategic interdependence between individual legislator’s decisions to defect and the 
“when”, “who” and “how” of party defection. To illustrate the points, this sub-section 
engages the quantitative works on the party defections in Japan (Cox and Rosenbluth 
1995; Kato 1998; Kato and Yamamoto 2005; Imai 2000; Kimura 1998; 1998a; Laver and 
Kato 2001; Nakajō 2000; Reed and Scheiner 2003; Tatebayashi 2002).8 
These works assume that legislators who defect from a party make rational 
decisions resulting from individual political ambition.9 The individual political ambition 
can be electoral goal, office goal, policy goal, a combination of any of these two, or all. 
Consequently, the binary choice method (probit or logit analysis) is used in most of the 
party defection literature (for exceptions, see Kawato 1996; Boucek 2001).  
The extant literature’s dependent variable is dichotomous (party defection or no 
party defection) while the independent variables are usually individual attributes arising 
from a legislator’s individual political ambition. 10  There are two possible ways of 
expression. First, a legislator with a greater degree of a particular characteristic will be 
more or less likely to defect than another legislator with a lesser degree of that particular 
characteristic.11 Second, a legislator with a particular characteristic is more or less likely 
to defect than another legislator without that characteristic. 12  For instance, Cox and 
                                                 
8  Other quantitative works on other countries include Aldrich and Bianco (1992), Desposato (2006), 
Kruezer and Pettai (2003), Mejía-Acosta (2004), and Mershon and Heller (2003; 2005). 
9 For works on individual political ambition, see Schlesinger (1991) and Strom (1990). 
10 The typical individual attributes for analysis include seniority (e.g., the number of terms a legislator has 
been elected), electoral marginality (e.g., how much more votes the legislator won over the other legislators 
in the same district in the last election), ideological compatibility (e.g., the level of proximity of ideological 
orientation of the ruling party’s legislators with its party members and opposition party members) and share 
of spoils (how much of office, electoral or policy benefits the legislator gets).  
11 One commonly used characteristic is seniority, that is, the number of terms a legislator is elected. A 
common argument is that the less senior a legislator is, the less likely a legislator will defect. This is 
because the more junior legislator has a lesser stake in the party hence the political losses of defectors are 
minimal. 
12 One commonly used characteristic is the nature of the legislator’s electoral district. A legislator whose 




Rosenbluth (1995), in their analysis of the 1993 party defections in Japan, argues that a 
few types of legislators with certain characteristic tend to have a higher probability of 
defection than the other types of legislators. The legislators who have a higher probability 
of defection are those who are less senior, legislators who are more electorally marginal, 
legislators who are ideologically more compatible with opposition party members, and 
legislators who received fewer office benefits. 
Problem-1: The Lack of concern for causal mechanism  
The binary choice method is probabilistic, hence it cannot explain the “when” 
(why at this time and not earlier or later?), “who” (why this group but not the other group 
with similar characteristics?), and “how” of party defection (why defect in groups or in 
factions?).13  The standard argument of the extant party defection literature is that a 
legislator with a characteristic will be more likely or less likely to defect. This sounds 
logical but upon comparison with other cases, this argument cannot account for cases 
whereby despite the presence of all the conditions for party defection, party defection did 
not occur.  
Take for example, the Hata factional defection from the LDP in 1993. Most of the 
extant studies argued that junior members (that is, those who are elected to the legislature 
for one to three terms) are more likely to defect because of their lesser share of office 
                                                                                                                                                 
area. The urban legislator is more sensitive to public opinion swings hence the legislator will defect once 
the opportunity arises. 
13 Other works also express similar views. For instance, “…while it can be assumed that similar individual 
motivations move deputies to yield or to defect from party cooperation, it is more difficult to determine at 
what point the undisciplined deputy is more likely to renounce (or be expelled by) the party organization” 
(Mejia-Acosta 1999, 5). Harker (2003) argues “…often time is of essence in the intra and inter-party games 




benefits (e.g., Cox and Rosenbluth 1995; Kato 1998). 14  This argument is not valid 
because there were also other factions that had a sizeable number of junior legislators 
who were elected one to three terms (table 2-3). As such, why did these legislators not 
defect but only the Hata faction’s junior legislators? Moreover, the Mitsuzuka faction had 
a higher percentage of junior legislators (66.7 percent of the Mistuzuka factional 
membership) than the Hata faction (64.5 percent of the Hata factional membership). Thus, 
why did the whole Mitsuzuka faction not defect too?15  
Table 2-3. Composition of LDP faction members based on number of legislative terms elected16 
 1 to 3 terms (%) 4 to 9 terms (%) 10 terms and above (%)
Obuchi faction  26.9 53.8 19.2 
Miyazawa faction  36.5 59.6 3.8 
Watanabe faction  37.8 59.5 2.7 
Mitsuzuka faction  66.7 31.4 2 
Komoto faction  50 36.4 13.6 
Hata faction  64.5 35.5 0 
Source: Kokkai Binran, 1993.  
 
Besides not being able to explain the “who” and the “how”, the extant studies also 
cannot explain the “when” of party defection. Since a particular legislator possesses 
certain characteristics for some time, in the period between the previous election and the 
next election, why did he defect in time X but not in time Y? For instance, the dominant 
party, the LDP, experienced many factional crises but a major key factional defection 
happened only after 38 years of its rule. Thus, why did a factional defection occur in 
1993 and not in other years? More importantly, individual legislators of the Hata faction 
                                                 
14 For a different argument, see Masuyama and Tatebayashi (2002). They argue that the relationship 
between electoral strength is not linear, that is, legislators who are electorally very strong and those who are 
electorally very weak tend to defect. 
15 Another example is the policy preference of the legislators. For instance, Reed and Scheiner (2003) argue 
that policy preference for political reform is the key impetus for Hata factional defection. Nevertheless, 
besides the Hata factional members, there were also other LDP legislators who were interested in political 
reforms. Eventually, only Hata faction and Takemura Group members defected. Thus, why did these two 
groups of legislators defect and not the other pro-reformers? 





possessed their characteristics (e.g., seniority, electoral marginality, ideological 
compatibility, and share of spoils) since the 1990 Lower House election. For instance, 
their seniority and electoral vulnerability remained the same since the 1990 Lower House 
election. Thus, why did these legislators not defect from the LDP in 1991 or 1992 but 
chose 1993? This suggests the importance of timing and strategic calculations.  
Problem-2: The Lack of Concern for the Group Incentive 
The extant literature’s binary choice method is “strategically-blind” as it assumes 
that a legislator’s incentive structure for defection is a function of only the legislator’s 
individual attributes. The cases are analyzed singly and independently with the implicit 
premise that a legislator’s decision to defect from a party is independent of other 
legislators’ decisions. The main reason is due to the differing analytical framework used. 
For instance, most of the extant literature uses the exit, voice and loyalty framework 
developed by Hirschman (1970) to show that party defection in party politics is similar to 
the consumer behavior in the choice of service or products. This Exit, Voice, Loyalty 
framework posits that consumers dissatisfied with a product or service may either 
complain (voice) or switch to buy other products or services (exit). Similarly, the party 
defection assumes similar mechanisms for party defection.  
Consequently, this ignores the empirical results of party defection. A legislator 
belongs to a party and some intra-party faction, which provides the group incentive (i.e., 
the collective incentive that a legislator enjoys by the virtue of being in the group). Extant 
literature, by focusing only the individual incentive, does not take into account of the 




interdependence between legislators’ strategic choice. 17  As such, when a legislator 
contemplates defection, he or she has to balance the conflicting interests between the 
individual incentive and the group incentive because of the changed party and factional 
affiliation. As Wolfe (2003) argues “…the decision of one particular rebel was contingent 
on expectations about how many others would quit” (405). Thus, individual legislators’ 
decisions to defect are interdependent and the number of legislators who eventually 
defects is a key factor in the decision-making. 
2.1.3 The Problems of Parties as the Unit of Analysis 
After dealing with the deficiencies of the individual legislator as the unit of 
analysis, this sub-section discusses the deficiencies of using the other commonly used 
unit of analysis, the party. The common basic assumption in the coalition literature or 
party defection literature is that parties are unitary actors. As Laver and Schofield (1990) 
explains, “parties do in practice tend to go into and out of government as single actors, 
however painful the wound inflicted upon them inside the black box [intra-party conflict] 
might have been” (15). Nevertheless, this assumption is not valid for explaining factional 
defection as it has an implicit connotation that party defection is a party split rather than 
politicians moving out of the party. The notion of party split indicates that exogenous 
factors rather than endogenous factors within the party cause party defection. 
Consequently, the extant literature attributes the causal factors for party defection to 
macro-level factors like ideological shifts (Sasaki 1999), historical consequence of 
democratization (Flanagan and Lee 2000; Giliomee and Simkins 1999), party system 
                                                 
17 A few works focus on the interdependent individual legislators’ decisions as an independent variable by 
using individual legislator as the unit of analysis (Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Desposato 2006; Mershon and 
Heller 2003). This thesis focuses on the interdependent strategic incentives in the inter-party and the intra-




changes (Boucek 1998), voter realignment caused by public distrust of the government 
(Reed 1999; Saitō 1996), the historical changes socioeconomic composition of the party’s 
support base (Pempel 1998), and/or changes in the values of the voters (Chung 1998; 
Mair and Sakano 1998). Such factors provide only the context but are not able to give the 
specific conditions for the timing and casual factors of party defection.  
Take for example the 1993 defections from Japan’s dominant party, the LDP. As 
part of their argument, Cox and Rosenbluth (1995) argues that a confluence of macro-
level factors, exogenous to the LDP, caused the 1993 party defections by making LDP’s 
ability to sustain its dominance in the near future appeared bleak. The three main macro-
level factors are: 
 Ideological.   Legislators tend to join parties with similar ideological 
orientation hence the decreased ideological distance between the ruling party 
legislators and the opposition party legislators will increase the probability of 
party defection from the ruling party. Thus, in 1993, as the ideological distance 
between the LDP legislators and opposition party legislators decrease due to the 
end of the Cold War, the LDP legislators were more likely to defect from the 
party. 18  
 Political Economy.   The poorer the country’s economic performance is, the 
more likely the legislators will defect from the ruling party. The poor economic 
performance indicates the ruling party’s incapability to manage the economy 
thereby engendering a public disappointment with the ruling party. As a result, the 
ruling party may lose votes in the next election and the ruling party legislators 
will most likely defect to prevent their individual reputation from being tarnished 
                                                 




by the party’s poor performance. Thus, in 1993, as the LDP was discredited with 
the mismanagement of the economy thereby causing the economic depression, the 
LDP legislators were more likely to defect from the party.19  
 Electoral.  The change in the socio-economic composition and the geographic 
distribution of the electorate (e.g., increased urbanization of the population) may 
change the pattern of public support for the ruling party. The ruling party’s 
support base may be built on specific socio-economic groups or geographic 
groups. For instance, the LDP’s support base was build upon a network of party 
organizations in the rural areas. Thus, increased urbanization will decrease the 
relative influence of the rural supporters, which in turn will decrease the votes that 
the ruling party will win. This in turn increases the probability of legislators 
defecting from the ruling party if the public support for the ruling party declines. 
Thus, in 1993, as the LDP’s public support was eroding (because of the increased 
urbanization has created a pool of apathetic voters and also reduced the LDP’s 
rural support base), the LDP legislators were more likely to defect from the 
party.20 
These macro-level arguments sounds logical but upon comparison with similar 
circumstances in other historical periods, it exposes the flaws of these macro-level factors. 
For instance, despite similar macro-level factors that indicated the probable demise of the 
LDP’s rule in both periods, party defection did not occur in 1980 but occurred in 1993 
(table 2-4). On the ideological front, the Détente (late 1970s) and the end of the Cold War 
(early 1990s) minimized the ideological divide in the Japanese party system. On the 
                                                 
19 For similar views, see Pempel (1998). 




economical front, the economic depression caused by the oil crisis (late 1970s) and the 
bursting of the economic bubble (early 1990s) caused the LDP to lose its ruling 
legitimacy.21 On the electoral front, the increased urbanization of the voters (late 1970s) 
and the increasing voter apathy in the early 1990s caused changes in the pattern of voter 
alignment that eroded the LDP’s support base. Accordingly, the non-variance of these 
independent variables suggests that other causal factors must have accounted for the 
difference. Most of the works in the dominant party literature, however, often attribute 
the dominant party’s loss of power to at least one of these macro-level factors (e.g., Philip 
2002; Tan 2002). 
Table 2-4. Cross-time Comparison of Macro-level Factors 
 Ideological Economic Electorate 
1980 case Cold War-Détente Post-1975 Oil Shock Urbanization of the electorate 
1993 case End of Cold War Economic Bubble burst in late 
1980s 
Increasingly urban and 
unsympathetic electorate 
Source: Cox and Rosenbluth (1995), 364-6.  
 
 
2.2 Nested Games: The Theoretical Model for Factional Defection 
This thesis chooses the model developed by Horiuchi and Tay (2004) as it is the 
only model that analyzes factional defection. This section aims to explain the rationale 
for the choice of this model by focusing on the choice of the theoretical approach (section 
2.2.1), the choice of unit of analysis (section 2.2.2), and the choice of the specific game 
theoretic framework (section 2.2.3). Finally, section 2.2.4 explains the role of the two key 
parliamentary institutions in the model, the no-confidence motion and the prime 
ministerial election.  
                                                 
21 The LDP was credited with the rebuilding the Japanese economy from the shambles after World War II 




2.2.1 Why Game Theory? 
The extant party defection literature uses two main non-game theoretic 
approaches: the quantitative approach and the qualitative approach. The quantitative 
approach is the binary choice method that has been explained in section 2.1.2. This 
literature is U.S. and European centric but with a burgeoning literature that applies the 
concepts to Japanese politics (e.g., Cox and Rosenbluth 1995; Imai 2000; Laver and Kato 
2001; Kato 1998; Kato and Yamamoto 2005; Kimura 1998; 1998a; Nakajō 2000; Reed 
and Scheiner 2003; Tatebayahsi 2002). In short, as explained in section 2.1, the main 
weakness of such quantitative works is that it does not account for the group and strategic 
level factors of party defection, and it does not explain the casual mechanisms of party 
defection. In contrast, the qualitative approach account for the group and strategic levels 
of party defection by attributing party defection to the failure of dominant party leaders to 
maintain intra-party consensus (Boucek 2001; 2005), the dominant party’s malaise 
(Bettcher 2001), and the ability of intra-party elements to overcome collective action 
problems (Wolfe’s 1999).22 These works argue that the long-term institutionalization of 
intra-party factionalism will increase transaction costs and force the factions to defect. 
For instance, Bettcher (2001) argues that the long-term institutionalization of intra-party 
factionalism will cause an eventual conflict of interests between the faction and the party; 
thereby causing party defection.23 In addition, Wolfe (1999) highlights the collective 
action problems of party defection and argues for the importance of tactics and trust to 
overcome the collective action problems.  
                                                 
22 This thesis focuses only on works that uses theoretical framework to explain factional defection. There 
are also other narrative works that only describe the events. 
23  Bettcher (2001) argues that three factors caused the 1993 party defection. These three factors are 
“…changes in the competitive environment, changes in the socio-economic coalition that supported the 




The main disadvantage of these two non-game theoretic approaches is the 
exaggeration of the uniqueness of a single party defection case thereby failing to analyze 
systematically the strategic interactions between the defecting factions, groups and/or 
individuals. These studies cannot convincingly argue for the timing of the party defection. 
Thus, game theory is chosen because it offers a structure whereby the assumptions of the 
model and the incentive structure of the actors are clearly defined. This will in turn 
produce falsifiable propositions and allow future modification of the model. Moreover, it 
shows the logic of interdependent strategic actions between two key intra-party actors: 
the MFC and the AMFC.  
2.2.2 The Advantages of Factions as the Unit of Analysis 
As using the individual legislator (section 2.1.2) and the political party (section 
2.1.3) as the unit of analysis are weak in explaining party defection, the alternative is to 
focus on intra-party politics whereby the legislators’ strategic calculations are 
endogenized. This thesis is among the first few works that uses factions to analyze 
systematically party defection (e.g., Horiuchi and Tay 2004). 24  The extant literature 
analyzes intra-party politics by using two approaches. The first approach focuses on party 
leaders and their relationships with different intra-party actors. This takes the form of 
leader-follower conflicts (Lubbert 1986; Maeda 2005; Muller and Strom 1999), and intra-
leadership conflict (Maor 1995; 1998; Strom 2001). The second approach focuses on 
identifiable groups like factions (Leiserson 1968), parliamentary party groups (Giannetti 
                                                 
24 There are extensive studies that analyze how factionalism affects a variety of dependent variables e.g., 
cabinet duration (Druckman 1996), parties’ policy spaces (Sinnot 1989), parties’ organization and identity 
(Harmel et al.1995; Harmel and Tan 2003), and inter-party coalition bargaining (Laver 1999; Laver and 




and Laver 2005; Heidar and Koole 2000; Rüland et al. 2005, 197-202), or other kinds of 
intra-party groups (Bettcher 2001).  
This thesis has chosen the faction as the unit of analysis. A faction within a 
political party is defined as “any formally recognized and relatively organized group that 
exists within the context of other factions and which, in turn functions as a political 
grouping [i.e., political party] that competes with rivals for power advantages within the 
larger groups [i.e., legislature] of which it is a part” (Beller and Belloni 1978, 419). 
Factions are identifiable entities and the key players in many party systems like Italy 
(Beller and Belloni 1978; Bettcher 2001; Giannetti and Laver 2005), Japan (Bouissou 
2001; Browne and Kim 2003; Kohno 1997), Brazil (Ames 2001), and even in two party 
systems like the United Kingdom (Kam 2002) and the United States (Reiter 2004). Thus, 
factions cannot be ignored and even at times are more important than political parties 
are.25 
The main advantage of using factions as the unit of analysis is that it allows 
systematic analysis of party defection in relation to the inter-party and intra-party 
coalition dynamics. Legislators bargain collectively in groups, for it gives them the 
critical mass to fight for synergistic gains. Such synergistic gains are less likely to be 
made if the legislators defect individually. Parties distribute office benefits through 
factions. The larger the faction the more office benefits that it is likely to get because the 
office benefits distribution is generally based on a faction’s proportion of seat share. By 
securing more office benefits, the faction attracts more legislators thereby further 
increases its factional size. Consequently, the faction’s power is further strengthened. As 
                                                 
25 In his analysis of coalition durability, Chambers (2003) argues that “factions appear to influence coalition 




such, the over-riding concern for a faction contemplating defection is its political 
prospects after defection. In other words, the faction needs to ensure that it has the critical 
mass to deprive the dominant party of a ruling majority and at the same time be able to 
form an alternative inter-party winning coalition that is more attractive than the present 
one. 26 If too few legislators defect, these defectors cannot form a party large enough to 
play a key role in the legislative politics, which in turn will lower their prospect of 
political survival and may mean a high risk of political marginalization.  
2.2.3 Why Nested Games? 
After choosing game theory as the theoretical model and faction as the unit of 
analysis, this sub-section discusses the rationale for choosing nested games (Tsebelis 
1990) over the portfolio allocation model (Laver and Shepsle’s 1999). A nested is 
concern with how actors acting in multiple arenas seek to optimize their benefits in each 
arena by taking account of other arenas.27 An external observer observing the actor’s 
strategic choice in a particular arena may see her choice as “sub-optimal” because the 
“…observer’s perspective is incomplete” (Tsebelis 1990, 7). If the observer takes into 
account of the strategic choices in all the arenas, the observer sees that the choice that the 
actor makes become optimal. This is the crux of factional defection because the apparent 
irrational choice of defecting from a dominant party becomes rational once the strategic 
incentive structure of the faction in the inter-party arena and intra-party arena are 
accounted for. In contrast, Laver and Shepsle (1999) uses policy-seeking factions as the 
                                                 
26 As Wolfe (1999) points out, these “…well-crafted quantitative analysis of defection [referring to the 
probit analysis of Cox and Rosenbluth (1995) and Kato (1998)]…ignore…the numerical strength to deprive 
the dominant party of its legislative majority” (405). 
27 Nested game has been used by Chambers (2003) in the analysis of cabinet durability and Kawato (1996) 
in the analysis of intra-party post allocation. Nested games also have been used in other contexts, like the 




unit of analysis and argue that if a faction “expects to be able to win standoffs with other 
parties, then it may well be rational for it to defect from [a party]” (Laver and Shepsle 
1999, 45). Thus, if the legislators have closer policy orientation with the opposition 
parties, they will defect to the opposition party.  
There are four main weaknesses of the portfolio allocation model. First, the model 
deals with routine policy disagreements, which are inherent within parties. There are two 
main kinds of policy: routine policy that is deliberated regularly in the legislature (e.g., 
formulating the government budget and the foreign policy); and institutional-change 
policy that can change the rules of the game in the legislature (e.g., electoral reform and 
constitutional revision). The former is a source of constant conflict between different 
parties and factions within parties hence does not provide the variance that is useful for 
predicting factional defection from dominant party. Such policy disagreement has been 
translated into party discipline breaches whereby the “dissident” legislators vote against 
the party line. This has been widely analyzed in the extant party discipline literature, as 
voice (Ames 2001; Krehbiel 1998; Morgenstern 2004) according to the exit, voice and 
loyalty framework developed by Hirschman (1970).  
The latter is an institutional change that changes the incentive structure of all the 
legislators (see Andrews and Jackman 2005; Benoit 2004; Boix 1999). Consequently, it is 
more likely to cause factional defection from dominant party. Nonetheless, such a change 
in the rules of the games in a dominant party is rare as the dominant party controls the 
majority hence any possible change in the rules of the game can only occur with the help 




status quo, may decide to use the call for the change in the rules of the game to oust the 
MFC from power. 
Second, the nested games model does not impose a strict assumption of the actors 
while the portfolio allocation model is restrictive in its usage as they assume that the 
actors to be only policy-seeking. Third, the actor in the nested games is defined according 
to the analytical needs while the unit of analysis of portfolio allocation model is an 
individual legislator. As discussed in section 2.1.2, the individual legislator as unit of 
analysis does not highlight the empirical dynamics of party defection. As this thesis has 
chosen faction as the unit of analysis, the nested games can be used to form the model. 
Fourth, a nested game is best suited for the analysis of situations whereby political actors 
(the AMFC and the MFC of a dominant party) make simultaneous strategic decisions in 
two arenas (inter-party and intra-party arenas) interdependently. In contrast, the portfolio 
allocation model portrays a static bargaining environment and does not bring out the 
interdependence of the actors’ strategic calculations in the inter-party and intra-party 
arenas simultaneously.  
2.2.4 The Strategic Context of Factional Defection: The No-
confidence Motion and the Prime ministerial election 
After explaining the rationale for the choice of the model developed by Horiuchi 
and Tay (2004), this sub-section explains the strategic utility of the two key 
parliamentary institutions in the model, the prime ministerial election and the no-
confidence motion, that has been often overlooked in the extant literature. The 
fundamental logic of the parliamentary system is based on the legislature’s confidence in 




tools are the cabinet inauguration and the no-confidence motion votes that they are the 
opposition parties’ legislative tools against the ruling party. The other two tools are the 
confidence votes and the parliamentary dissolution that are the ruling party’s legislative 
tools against the opposition parties in the legislature. As the model deals with the possible 
strategies of the ruling party’s AMFC and the opposition parties against the ruling party, 
this thesis focuses on the former two tools.  
Each of these legislative mechanisms serves dual strategic utility for the AMFC 
and the opposition parties. The first strategic utility is the offer of a window of 
opportunity. The no-confidence motion offers the window of opportunity, that is, the 
upcoming Lower House election whereby the opposition parties can cooperate with each 
other and the ruling party’s AMFC (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 1996; Lupia 
and Strom 1995; Strom and Swindle 2002). The prime ministerial election offers the 
window of opportunity for the opposition parties to nominate a common prime 
ministerial candidate to compete against the ruling party’s prime ministerial candidate. It 
also offers the ruling party’s AMFC a window of opportunity to nominate its prime 
ministerial candidate with opposition parties’ endorsement, or to support opposition 
parties’ prime ministerial candidate thereby compete with the MFC’s prime ministerial 
candidate. The second strategic utility is signaling. The opposition parties use these two 
legislative tools to signal to the ruling party’s dissident elements (i.e., the AMFC) of the 
opposition parties’ commitment to coordinate to nominate a single prime ministerial 
candidate and/or to vote for the no-confidence motion. The AMFC also signal to the 




opposition parties to endorse its prime ministerial candidate and/or to vote for or to 
absent from the no-confidence motion vote.  
Prime Ministerial Election  
The most critical coordination problem facing the opposition parties is the 
nomination of a common prime ministerial candidate. This is caused by the triple 
coordination failures. There are two steps in the cabinet inauguration process before the 
formation of a new inter-party ruling coalition: the prime ministerial election by the 
legislature, and who then in turn forms the cabinet. One of the main reasons for a 
dominant party’s long-term dominance is the opposition party weaknesses rather than the 
dominant party strength (Bettcher 2001, 167). Nevertheless, these works cannot answer 
two puzzles: first, despite forming electoral coalitions and pre-electoral alliances between 
opposition parties during the elections, this cooperation has seldom transformed into 
cooperation to form a new inter-party ruling coalition. Second, even if there is a high 
feasibility of coalition formation by the opposition parties in terms of ideological distance 
or seat share, the opposition parties are often unable to form a new inter-party ruling 
coalition.28 
Contrary to the extant literature, this thesis argues that the coordination failure 
between opposition parties arises due to the inability to nominate a common prime 
ministerial candidate rather than inability to find suitable coalition partners (c.f. 
Christensen 2000, Johnson 2000; Scheiner 2003). The cause is that the extant coalition 
formation literature overlooks the intricate cooperation mechanisms that are needed for 
                                                 
28 For instance, after the 1953 Lower House election, the Liberal Party lost its legislative majority with 42.7 
percent seat share vis-à-vis the opposition parties’ 52.4 percent. There was a high chance for a non-Liberal 
Party coalition to be formed but the opposition parties failed to nominate an alternative single prime 
ministerial candidate to the Liberal Party candidate, Yoshida Shigeru (Nakakita 2002, 18). Consequently, 




the opposition parties to overcome the coordination failure. This is because the analytic 
end point of the extant coalition literature is the coalition government formation but this 
misses the most critical parliamentary mechanism of coalition formation: the prime 
ministerial election. The prime minister must be elected by the legislature before he or 
she has the mandate to form a new cabinet hence the crux of the coordination failure 
among opposition parties is more of the opposition parties’ failure to have the joint 
nomination of a single prime ministerial candidate than the non-feasibility of coalition 
partners. In other words, the increasing ideological proximity between the ruling party 
and the opposition parties, or the opposition parties’ increased relative seat share vis-à-vis 
the ruling party may not necessary cause the opposition parties to nominate a common 
prime ministerial candidate. Consequently, even if the opposition parties agree to 
cooperate to form a inter-party coalition, the inability to nominate a common prime 
ministerial candidate in the prime ministerial election will still be an obstacle. 
The opposition parties need to overcome three levels of coordination in a joint 
nomination of a single prime ministerial candidate. The first level of coordination is in 
the intra-party arenas of each opposition party. The opposition party leader needs to reach 
a consensus with her intra-party elements on the choice of prime ministerial candidate 
(either from her own party or from another party). The second level of coordination is 
among the opposition parties. The opposition parties need to coordinate among 
themselves to nominate a single prime ministerial candidate. The third level of 
coordination is to entice an intra-party element of the dominant party to vote for the 
opposition parties’ prime ministerial candidate instead of the dominant party’s candidate. 




hence the opposition parties are unlikely to have enough votes to secure the prime 
ministerial post. In the 1979 prime ministerial election, the dominant party, for the first 
time in history, produced two prime ministerial candidates, Ōhira Masayoshi and Fukuda 
Takeo. Nevertheless, the opposition parties failed to coordinate to sponsor either one, or 
to jointly nominate their own prime ministerial candidate. If the opposition parties 
cooperated, a new ruling coalition would have replaced the dominant party. Overcoming 
this coordination failure for the prime minister nomination is slightly easier in the context 
of a non-dominant party system because the last coordination is not needed. Even then, 
the coordination failure is still insurmountable throughout the 58 years of Japanese 
political history (1945-2003).29 These three interdependent coordination problems have 
plagued the opposition parties most of the time.30  
No-confidence motion  
This sub-section explains the inherent difficulty of passing of a no-confidence 
motion in a dominant party system. In Japan, a minimum of 50 legislators is required to 
propose a no-confidence motion (Koichi 1983, 57). A no-confidence motion is passed if 
more than 50 percent of the legislators who voted in the no-confidence motion vote 
(excluding the absentees) voted in support of the no-confidence motion. According to 
article 69 of the Japanese Constitution, if a no-confidence motion is passed in the Lower 
House, the Cabinet either resigns en masse or the Lower House is to be dissolved within 
ten days from the passing of the no-confidence motion. Forty-six no-confidence motions 
                                                 
29 There were only two cases of successful coordination, the election of Hosokawa Morihiro (the leader of 
the then fifth largest party, the Japan New Party) in 1993 and Hata Tsutomu in 1994 as prime minister. 
30 One of the few exceptions is the formation of a seven-party coalition government in Japan in 1993 which 
is contrary to the extant coalition formation theories. The largest party, the LDP, won 43.6 percent Lower 
House seats, three times the size of the next largest opposition party, the JSP (13.7 percent Lower House 
seat share) hence the LDP had a higher chance of getting its prime ministerial candidate elected. 
Nevertheless, the seven smaller parties coordinated their actions to nominate Hosokawa Morihiro (the 




were proposed in post war Japan from 1947 to 2003. Only four (8.7 percent) motions 
were passed, 27 (58.7 percent) motions failed, and 15 (32.6 percent) motions were not put 
to vote due to other reasons (e.g., Lower House dissolution or cabinet resignation before 
the vote was taken) (see appendix A).31  The four cases of passed no-confidence motion 
(the Yoshida cabinet in 1948, the Yoshida cabinet in 1953, the Ōhira cabinet in 1980 and 
the Miyazawa cabinet in 1993) resulted in the dissolution of the Lower House rather than 
a cabinet resignation. The impact of the dissolution of Lower House is significant in that 
all the Lower House legislators lose their seats and must prepare for the upcoming Lower 
House election. 
A dominant party holds the legislative majority in the legislature, hence a no-
confidence motion can only be passed with the dominant party legislators’ explicit 
cooperation (voting for the no-confidence motion) or implicit cooperation (absenting 
from the no-confidence motion). Three of the successful no-confidence motions were 
passed with the assistance of the ruling parties’ AMFC legislators and other ruling party 
dissidents (table 2-5). They either voted for the no-confidence motion (in 1953 and 1993) 
or absent themselves from the no-confidence motion (in 1980). The 1948 no-confidence 
motion was passed because the ruling party was a minority party hence it was natural for 




                                                 
31 Based on the data from Masuyama and Nyblade (2003), Japan’s 8.7 percent is twice of the Western 




Table 2-5. The Link between Passed No-confidence Motion and AMFC32 
 
Number of legislators 
who voted for 
Number of legislators 
who voted Against
Number of legislators 
who were absent 
Difference between 
both votes 
December 1948 227 130 NA +97 
March 1953 229 218 0 +11 
May 1980 243 187 78 +56 
June 1993 255 220 21 +35 
Source: Fujitmoto 1996, 42; Mainichi Shinbun, 15 March 1953; Asahi Shinbun, 17 May 1980; Asahi 
Shinbun, 19 June 1993. 
 
 Unlike the prime ministerial election, the coordination problems are less severe 
for no-confidence motion as the opposition parties tend to vote for the no-confidence 
motion as it serves their common interest. Consequently, the first two coordination, that 
is, the intra-opposition party coordination and the inter-opposition party coordination is 
overcome. The opposition parties only need to entice the dominant party’s AMFC to 
either vote for or absent themselves in the no-confidence motion vote. 
 
2.3 The Model   
As part of the analytic narrative approach, a model is formed by using the game 
theoretic model developed by Horiuchi and Tay (2004) to explain the narratives in 
chapter 3. Section 2.2 has explained the applicability of the model to this thesis hence this 
section elaborates the model’s details. The section begins with a discussion of the 
model’s assumptions and start point. This is followed by a detailed explanation of the 
model and the derivation of three propositions. The actor of the model is a factional 
coalition (the MFC and the AMFC) with faction as the unit of analysis. 
                                                 
32 In December 1948, as the ruling party, the Liberal Party, was a minority party, the no-confidence motion 




2.3.1   Assumptions  
As with most studies that use factions as the unit of analysis, the model assumes 
that factions are rational unitary office-seeking actors.33 Factions are rational entities 
within political parties that seek power, in other words, to maximize their office benefits. 
As mentioned, the main factional logic is to ally with enough factions to form a winning 
intra-party factional coalition in order to win the party presidential election. By securing 
the party presidency, the winning intra-party factional coalition, that is, the MFC, will 
gain the intra-party agenda control thereby ensuring its organizational survival through 
the distribution of office benefits  to its members.  
One possible disagreement with the assumption of factions as unitary actors is 
that factions are seldom unitary in reality. For instance, in the context of Japanese politics, 
if a faction chooses to defect from a party, the faction will split (Itō 1997; Reed 1990). 
Extending from this logic, factions will not defect from the party if it faces a possible 
factional split. This is because a factional split will decrease its factional size thereby 
decrease its bargaining power in the intra-party and inter-party power struggle. 
Nevertheless, in empirical reality, this does not happen. In all the factional defection 
cases, with the exception of the Hata factional defection in 1993, all the defected factions 
experienced factional splits (table 2-6). In other words, based on these few conditions, it 




                                                 





Table 2-6. Cases of split of factions that defected from the ruling party   
Factional defection Year of Defection Split? 
Hatoyama factional defection   1953 Yes 
Hirokawa factional defection   1953 Yes 
Kishi factional defection   1954 Yes 
Hatoyama factional defection   1954 Yes 
Hata factional defection   1993 No 
 
Extending from this argument, the assumption of faction as the unitary actor may 
be unrealistic in the model but I argue that it is still the best approach to studying 
factional defection. First, strategic actions can be meaningfully examined only if we look 
at factions for these are the potential defectors that have the potential to change the 
dynamics of the party system. Faction is chosen as it is the appropriate level of 
aggregation of the unit of analysis for this thesis. If the level of analysis goes lower than 
the faction, that is, sub-faction or the individual legislator, the analysis tends to slip into 
idiosyncrasy and not produce generalizable arguments. Second, to make this thesis’ 
argument more tractable and parsimonious, it is necessary for the explanations to be 
concise hence the need for only two-levels of analysis in the inter-party and intra-party 
arenas. Nevertheless, one possible independent variable for factional defection is the 
maintenance of the factional unity but I will leave it to future work. 
2.3.2 Start Point of the Game: The No-confidence Motion Vote   
The model starts with the no-confidence motion vote. One possible criticism of 
this start point is the unrealistic assumption that a faction’s decision to defect is made 
within seconds from the time a no-confidence motion is passed until its decision to defect. 
Nevertheless, this start point is still valid for the model for two reasons. First, the only 
two factional defections from the dominant party in Japan (Hatoyama factional defection 




confidence motion. Second, the no-confidence motion vote is an important strategic tool 
for both the opposition parties and the ruling party AMFC to show credible commitment. 
As explained earlier, a no-confidence motion is a signaling tool that signals the AMFC’s 
and the opposition parties’ commitment to cooperate to oust the existing government. By 
proposing a no-confidence motion, the opposition parties highlight to the ruling party’s 
AMFC of their willingness to cooperate in the inter-party arena. From the ruling party 
AMFC’s perspective, the AMFC’s voting for the no-confidence motion or even absenting 
from the no-confidence motion vote symbolizes the act of breaking party discipline.34 
This is the strongest indicator of the AMFC’s resolve to split the dominant party because 
by breaking the party discipline, the AMFC will likely suffer substantial political costs 
that can range from punishment by the MFC, legitimacy and the alienation of supporters 
from their electoral base. 
2.3.3   The Structure of the Model 35  
The model is a perfect information sequential game with the passing of the no-
confidence motion as the starting point. The unit of analysis, faction, is aggregated into 
the intra-party factional coalition because factions form intra-party factional coalition 
with each other to compete in the party presidential election within the party. 
Accordingly, there are two actors in the game – the MFC and the AMFC. These two 
factional coalitions were formed in the last intra-party presidential election. The intra-
party presidential selection is based on votes hence the factional coalition which is able to 
have more members than the other will win the party presidency. The winning inter-
factional coalition, the MFC, comprises the party president’s faction and a few other 
                                                 
34 If the AMFC decides to rebel (vote for or absent from the vote), it must be sure that the no-confidence 
motion will be passed, otherwise, the AMFC will lose legitimacy and subsequently political credibility. 




factions while the other factions form the losing inter-factional coalition, the AMFC. 
Factions within the factional coalition always consider its prospect of coalition building 
in both the inter-party and intra-party arenas simultaneously: the prospect of forming the 
future winning inter-party coalition with other opposition parties and the prospect of 
forming the future winning intra-party (i.e., inter-factional coalition) factional coalition 
with other factions.  
The reasons for focusing on these two actors is intuitive. The MFC controls most 
of the key decision making mechanisms within the dominant party hence it has the most 
stake in maintaining the dominant party’s majority in the inter-party arena. Maintaining 
dominant party’s dominance in the intra-party arena also provides it with more spoils 
thereby sustain the MFC’s dominance within the dominant party. The AMFC within the 
dominant party, as the losing coalition of factions, seeks to replace the existing MFC by 
winning the next presidential election. Consequently, the most likely factions to defect 
from the dominant party are the factions in the AMFC. 
This model takes place in a dominant party. Once the no-confidence motion is 
passed, the MFC’s dominant strategy will be to dissolve the Lower House and call for 
elections. 36  This means that the entire Lower House legislature’s legislators will lose 
their seats and must run for election. The first mover is the AMFC, which decides to 
defect (D) or not to defect (~D). If the AMFC chooses to defect, the game ends but if the 
AMFC chooses not to defect, the MFC will choose to punish the AMFC (P) or not punish 
the AMFC (~P). Below is the structure of the game. 
                                                 
36 The MFC’s dominant strategy is to dissolve the cabinet. This is based on the empirical evidence found in 
Japan. The four passed no-confidence motions in Japan between 1945 and 2003 resulted in the dissolution 
of the Diet. In addition, the only two cases of the cabinet resignation election masse (the 1954 Yoshida 
Cabinet and the 1994 Hata cabinet) occurred before the no-confidence motion was put to a vote. The reason 








MFC’s Incentive Structure and Strategic Choices 
 The MFC’s primary goal is to ensure that the dominant party stays in power by 
maintaining the dominant party’s majority. This serves two purposes for the MFC. In the 
inter-party arena, a legislative majority for the dominant party is important so that the 
party can push through its legislative agenda. This in turn enhances the dominant party’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of the voters. In the intra-party arena, a legislative majority for the 
dominant party is important in order to ensure the MFC’s intra-party legitimacy. This 
legitimacy then allows it to remain as the MFC. Being an MFC gives it an inherent 
advantage over the AMFC in terms of the office benefits (i.e., post and spoils allocation). 
The MFC will enjoy a relative advantage over the AMFC by securing more office 
benefits thereby allowing it to distribute the office benefits to more of its factional 
members. This will in turn increase the MFC’s power thereby further consolidate its 
dominance within the dominant party. The MFC’s secondary objective is to enforce party 
discipline. Maintaining the party discipline is important because it ensures the 













maintenance of the dominant party’s cohesion, which in turn will ensure the dominant 
party’s dominance in the legislature. The dominant party’s continued dominance allows 
the MFC to continue to enjoy the office benefits. Consequently, if there are acts of breach 
of party discipline (for instance, in the case of intra-party members’ voting for the no-
confidence motion) by the AMFC, the MFC will have a choice to punish it. The forms of 
punishment can be in the form of not endorsing the AMFC candidates and/or reducing 
the campaign resources allocated to the AMFC in the impending election. Without the 
party endorsement, the legislator will not have the party label and/or the financial 
resources to run the election campaign. This will greatly lower the chance of the 
candidate’s success (Asano 2003; Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1999, 35). The reduction 
in the number of candidates elected will result in a reduction of the AMFC’s relative 
Lower House seat share thereby reduce its bargaining power in the intra-party arena. 
 Nevertheless, the MFC may not always punish the AMFC because the MFC faces 
a dilemma. On the one hand, the MFC will increase its relative intra-party strength (i.e., 
the MFC’s seat share in the Lower House and the Upper House) vis-à-vis the AMFC’s 
relative intra-party strength thereby further consolidate its leadership position within the 
dominant party. On the other hand, the dominant party risks losing some seats thereby 
lower the MFC’s legitimacy in leading the party. This is because incumbent legislators 
have a higher probability of re-election than a new candidate from the same party does. 
To maintain the MFC’s legitimacy, the MFC must win more seats or at least maintain the 
dominant party’s seat share in order to ensure its party leadership. Thus, there is a 
correlation between the party’s Lower House seat share and the MFC’s willingness to 




for breaking party discipline by the MFC is high if the dominant party’s Lower House 
seat share is high and the probability of the dominant party obtaining a Lower House 
majority in the upcoming election is high. Thus, the following deduced lemma;  
Lemma 1: The larger the pre-election dominant party’s Lower House seat share, the 
more likely the MFC punishes the AMFC. 
AMFC’s Incentive Structure and Strategic Choices 
 The AMFC’s goal is to enhance its political power within the intra-party arena 
and the inter-party arena. Thus, it can choose to remain within the party, that is, not 
defect (~D) or to defect from the party (D). The AMFC’s utility is based on whether it 
will get more political power as a constituent faction of a dominant party or as a 
constituent party of an alternative inter-party coalition. In the latter scenario, the AMFC 
will most likely defect to form a new party and then join the new winning inter-party 
ruling coalition. In other words, the AMFC will defect from the dominant party if the 
expected utility of gaining power in the inter-party arena (i.e., forming a new inter-party 
coalition) is higher than the utility of gaining power in the intra-party arena (i.e., forming 
a new inter-factional coalition). In the inter-party arena, gaining power means that the 
AMFC joins a new ruling inter-party coalition that will replace the dominant party as the 
new ruling coalition while in the intra-party arena, gaining power means that the AMFC 
seeks to take control of the dominant party from the MFC with the dominant party 
remaining in power. Thus, with the above-mentioned goals and the conditionality in mind, 
the AMFC has two possible strategies, not to defect from the dominant party or to defect 




 First, the AMFC’s utility of not defecting from the party is a function of two 
factors: whether the MFC punishes it and how slim the MFC’s intra-party strength (i.e., 
the AMFC’s seat share in the Lower House and Upper House) is vis-à-vis the AMFC’s 
intra-party strength. For the former, if the MFC punishes the AMFC, the AMFC’s 
relative intra-party strength will decrease hence the probability of replacing the existing 
MFC and taking over the party leadership becomes lower. For the latter, if the MFC has 
only a slight advantage over the AMFC’s intra-party strength, the probability of the 
AMFC replacing the existing MFC and taking over the party leadership becomes higher. 
In short, the probability of the AMFC replacing the existing MFC negatively correlates 
with the probability of the MFC punishing the AMFC and the MFC’s relative legislature 
seat share. Since the MFC’s punishment of the AMFC positively correlates with the 
party’s seat share in the Lower House, the AMFC’s utility of remaining within the party 
is a function of these two factors. This forms the second lemma.   
Lemma 2: The smaller the pre-election dominant party’s Lower House seat share, 
and/or the smaller the MFC’s relative legislature seat share within the dominant party, 
the higher the AMFC’s utility to stay within the dominant party. 
 Second, the AMFC’s utility to defect from the party is that the AMFC can 
increase its political power by forming a new ruling inter-party coalition with the 
opposition parties. Thus, the probability that this new inter-party coalition can be formed 
(excluding the existing dominant party) is a function of two factors: first, the probability 
of the opposition parties having a sufficiently large number of Lower House seats to form 
a new inter-party coalition; second, the probability of the opposition parties being able to 




probability of party defection is partly a function of the dominant party’s pre-election 
Lower House seat share. If the dominant party has a slim Lower House majority, the 
higher the probability of the AMFC combining with the opposition parties’ Lower House 
seat share to outnumber the existing dominant party hence overthrowing it and forming a 
new inter-party ruling coalition. For the latter factor, the AMFC’s probability of party 
defection is also partly a function of the opposition parties’ ability to achieve successful 
coordination in nominating a new prime ministerial candidate. Thus the third lemma: 
Lemma 3: The smaller the pre-election dominant party’s Lower House seat share 
and the higher the chance for successful coordination among other parties in nominating 
an alternative candidate for prime minister, the higher the utility for the AMFC to defect 
from the dominant party. 
2.3.4 Propositions  
 With the three lemmas mentioned above, three theoretical propositions are raised.  
Proposition 1: A dominant party faction is not necessarily more likely to defect 
when its dominant party’s relative Lower House seat share is smaller. 
In other words, the lower the seat share of the dominant party do not necessarily 
mean that the factions would defect from a waning party for better political prospect. 
This is because when the dominant party’s Lower House seat share is slim, the AMFC 
faces a dilemma of party defection, which gives it an incentive and disincentive to defect. 
The inter-party incentive is that as the dominant party’s Lower House seat share decrease, 
there is a higher probability that the AMFC, by defecting from the dominant party will 




either forms a new party or merge with the party thereby forming a new inter-party 
winning coalition in the inter-party arena.  
Nevertheless, there is also an intra-party disincentive to defect. First, the 
probability of the MFC punishing it for breaking the party discipline is also lower. Thus, 
the AMFC will still maintain its intra-party strength. Second, the probability of the 
AMFC replacing the existing MFC and taking over the leadership of the party becomes 
higher after the no-confidence motion is passed. The dominant party’s decreased Lower 
House seat share means that the MFC’s control of the party will be weakened because its 
intra-party legitimacy is affected by the dominant party’s poor electoral performance. 
Consequently, the AMFC has a higher chance to gain power from the MFC in the 
dominant party by winning the party presidency. Thereafter, the dominant party’s leader 
(or party president) will automatically become the prime minister. In short, the AMFC 
has to balance the risks between defecting from the dominant party and build a new inter-
party ruling coalition, and that of staying within the dominant party and seek to replace 
the MFC. 
Proposition 2: A dominant party faction is more likely to defect when some 
factions within the party are more marginalized in intra-party competition. 
Marginalization is a situation whereby the AMFC’s chances of forming the next 
intra-party factional coalition to win the dominant party presidency are minimal. If the 
AMFC is marginalized, factional members’ perception of their faction’s survival will be 
in doubt and may result in a factional split thereby leading to the faction’s demise. Thus, 
the marginalized factions may have no choice but to defect from the dominant party in 




Proposition 3: A dominant party faction is more likely to defect when the chance 
of nominating a single alternative prime ministerial candidate is higher. 
The formation of a ruling coalition is a two-step process, starting with the 
selection of a prime ministerial designate in the prime ministerial election followed by 
the formation of the cabinet by the elected prime minister. For a defecting faction, the 
prospects of forming a new inter-party ruling coalition government with another party (or 
even merge with that party) are critical. If the opposition parties are able to overcome the 
three levels of coordination as mentioned in section 2.2.4 and formed a united front vis-à-
vis the dominant party by agreeing to nominate a single prime ministerial candidate to 
compete against the dominant party’s candidate in the prime ministerial election, the 
AMFC will be more likely to defect. This AMFC-opposition party coordination problem 
is based on expectation and the bargaining horizon. 
 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter started with a literature review of the extant literature weaknesses in 
explaining party defection: the failure to differentiate the types of party defection, and the 
failure to depict the casual mechanisms of factional defection by the party defection 
literature and the dominant party literature. Section 2.2 explained the choice for the 
model developed by Horiuchi and Tay (2004) by rationalizing the choice of game theory 
as the theoretical approach, the choice of faction as the unit of analysis, and the choice of 
nested games as the game theoretic approach. In addition, the strategic utilities of the no-
confidence motion and the prime ministerial election were also explained. The game 




three propositions. The model’s proposition 2 and 3 are the causal factors of factional 
defection from a dominant party. These propositions are hardly new but the key 
contribution of the model is to set these two propositions into a coherent theoretical 
framework whereby the extant literature has not done so. The next chapter will build on 
the arguments in chapter 1 and 2 by crafting this thesis’ research design and elaborating 




Chapter 3       Empirical Findings 
 
This chapter aims to explain the research design and the empirical findings from 
the model developed in chapter 2. This thesis takes the analytic narrative approach to 
trace systematically the causal mechanism of factional defection by using a model and 
case comparison. As factional defection occurs rarely, this thesis aims to carry out small 
N in-depth case study. As such, a parsimonious definition of the case selection criteria is 
critical because politicians move in and out of political parties in different ways. This 
requires the identification of the universe followed by specifying the sample of the 
relevant and the irrelevant cases. This provides clear concepts for the operationalization 
and the measurement of the variables. Section 3.2 provides the context for the cases 
analysis with an overview of the evolution of the Japanese politics from 1945 to 2003 by 
focusing on the key conservative parties in the Japanese party system and its intra-party 
factional developments. Section 3.3 discusses the narratives of the four cases in details 
for proposition validation. Finally, the chapter ends off with a discussion of the findings 
and the implications. 
3.1 Research Design: Analytic Narrative 
 This thesis uses the analytic narrative approach because it offers a good 
combination of theoretical rigor and narrative richness. Narrative alone cannot answer the 
question of why party defection occurred and why party defection did not occur when the 
necessary conditions are present. Thus, the analytic (model) provides a framework for 
systematic examination of narrative evidence. The unit of analysis is faction and a 




Factional defections from a dominant party are rare events hence a case-oriented 
approach is chosen over a variable-oriented approach in order to trace the causal 
mechanisms of factional defection. This allows it to exchange breadth for depth by using 
case comparison. In Japan’s 58 years (1945-2003) of parliamentary democracy, there are 
only two cases of factional defection from the dominant party (table 3-1).1 The positive 
cases (i.e., factional defection cases) are the Hatoyama AMFC (14 March 1953) and the 
Hata faction (22 June 1993) while the negative cases (i.e., non-occurrence of factional 
defection cases whereby all the necessary conditions were present) are the Fukuda AMFC 
(16 May 1980) and the Katō AMFC (21 November 2000). The fresh approach of game 
theoretic model also provides a coherent model for systematic case comparison.  
 
Table 3-1. Factional Defection and Non-Factional defection Cases 
Date Who Mother Party To Size
Positive Cases     
14 March 1953 Hatoyama AMFC     Liberal Party Hatoyama Liberal Party 22 
22 June 1993 Hata faction2 LDP  Japan Renewal Party  35 
     
Negative Cases     
16 May 1980 Fukuda AMFC  LDP – 72 
21 November 2000 Katō AMFC   LDP – 51 
 
Consequently, this thesis chose single nation comparison. Japan is chosen as the 
nation of study because the majority of the governments formed in the post-war period 
(1945-2003) were dominant party governments hence this provides numerous 
observations. Over these 58 years, 22 Lower House elections were held in Japan with 44 
governments formed. Of this, 84.1 percent (37 governments) of governments were 
                                                 
1 Study of rare events can be found in the literature of international relations (King and Zeng 2001) like 
deterrence failure (Achen and Snidal 1989); and analyzed in comparative politics literature like electoral 
reform (Andrews and Jackman 2005; Boix 1999), political reform (Wolfe 1999), and occurrence of 
revolutions (Boswell and Linton 2004). 




majority governments and 70.5 percent (31 governments) were majority governments 
with a dominant party.3 In addition, as compared to other established democracies, Japan 
has the highest frequency of fissions and fusions hence it provides the maximum number 
of cases for analysis (table 3-2). 4   
 
Table 3-2. Fissions and Fusions by Country (1945-1987)5 
  Number of fissions Number of fusions 
Austria 1 1 
Belgium 3 2 
Denmark 5 0 
Finland 5 4 
Germany 0 1 
Iceland 5 1 
Ireland 2 2 
Italy 3 4 
Luxemburg 2 0 
Netherlands 4 2 
Norway 3 0 
Sweden 0 1 
Switzerland 1 0 
United Kingdom 0 0 
Japan  6 5 
   
Source: Mair (1990, 133).  
 
 
As a result, because of the small N and the deliberate choice of cases, this thesis’ 
main weakness is the selection bias. Nevertheless, a small N approach presents the best 
cut for the study of factional defection as the extant literature does not provide 
convincing explanations for factional defection and their parameters of research design 
                                                 
3 Majority government means the Lower House seat share of the ruling party or ruling coalition is more 
than 50 percent. 
4 Fission is a “collective reaffiliation strategy in which a minority group of politicians breaks away from an 
established party to form a new party” (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003, 79). Fusion is a “collective reaffiliation 
strategy through which a majority of members from two or more parties merge to form a totally new party” 
(Kreuzer and Pettai 2003, 78).  
5 This thesis has added Japan’s figures for the cases of fission and fusion in Mair’s (1990) study of fissions 
and fusions in Western democracies between 1945 and 1987. The table excludes cases where fissions 




are vague. To ameliorate this methodological weakness, this thesis has produced a strict 
definition of non-factional defection cases by using the no-confidence motion vote as the 
focal point.     
3.1.1 Case Selection: The Choice of Relevant Cases and Irrelevant 
Cases  
Analyzing factional defection from dominant party presents a conceptual 
challenge for case definition. This involves a strict and parsimonious selection criterion 
for the cases followed by differentiating the relevant cases (positive cases and negative 
cases) and irrelevant cases. This approach has not been used in the extant literature and 
no studies have defined the cases in such a strict manner. 
Relevant Cases: Positive and Negative Cases of Factional Defection 
Factional defection from a dominant party is a rare event hence the frequency of 
positive cases is much lesser than the non-positive cases. The non-positive cases 
comprise the negative cases and the irrelevant cases. 6  The rationale for defining a 
negative case is to extract the relevant cases from the numerous cases whereby no 
factional defection occurred, otherwise it may “produce erroneous causal inferences, just 
as can a sample with too many positive cases” (Mahoney and Goretz 2004, 656). 
A positive case exhibits factional defection while a negative case does not exhibit 
factional defection. These two types of cases must meet three criteria. The first criterion 
is that the mother party of the defected faction must be a dominant party with more than 
50 percent Lower House seat share. The bare majority of 50 percent is chosen because if 
the ruling party has less than 50 percent Lower House seat share, the opposition parties 
                                                 
6 Other works which deal with negative cases are Mahoney and Goretz (2004), Harding, Fox and Mehta 




could form an alternative ruling coalition. The 50 percent seat share in the legislature 
may not be applicable to all contexts because in some countries, the opposition parties are 
very highly divided such that a dominant party or ruling coalition can rule without getting 
more than 50 percent of seat share. In Italy, a party with 35 percent seat share will suffice 
for it to dominate the ruling coalition (Scheiner 2001, 3). This is a limitation of the model 
but I will leave this to future research.7  
The second criterion is that the dominant party’s AMFC must voice in the no-
confidence vote just before or after the party defection. Voice in the no-confidence 
motion means that the AMFC must either vote for or absent during the no-confidence 
motion voting. Past historical data in Japan has shown that factional defection from a 
dominant party occurs when the AMFC voice in a no-confidence motion vote. The third 
criterion is that the faction must be a relevant large faction within the dominant party. A 
relevant faction is a faction that is needed to form a winning inter-factional coalition. 
There are usually a few large factions within parties that are critical for the formation of a 
winning inter-factional coalition. Based on these three criteria, only two factional 
defection cases are selected from the six factional defection cases, the 1953 Hatoyama 





                                                 
7 Blondel (1968) and Ware (1996) stated that a dominant party must be a party that has secured a minimum 




Table 3-3. Factional Defection and Group Defection in Japan (1945-2003) 8 
When Who From To Size 
Factional Defection     
Fission     
28 November 1947 Shidehara Faction  Democratic Party Comrade Club  24 
14 March 1953 Hatoyama Faction  Liberal Party Hatoyama Liberal Party 22 
15 March 1953   Hirokawa Faction  Liberal Party Hatoyama Liberal Party 15 
24 November 1954 Hatoyama Faction 
and Kishi Faction 
Liberal Party Japan Democratic Party  43 
22 June 1993 Hata faction LDP  Japan Renewal Party  35 
5 April 2000 Ogi Faction 9  Liberal Party  New Conservative Party 18 
     
Group Defection     
Party Switch     
     
31 March  1947 Ashida group Liberal Party Democratic Party  10 
23 January 1950 Kimura group   
Democratic Pro-
coalition  Democratic Anti-coalition 6 
     
Fission     
20 February 1948 Tanaka Maiitsu 
Group 
Democratic Party  Democratic Club 6 
12 March 1948 Saitō Takao Group  Democratic Party Democratic Club 14 
15 March 1948 Sekō Kōichi Group  Liberal Party  Japan Liberal Party  6 
17 June 1948 Ozawa Group  Democratic Party  Japan National Party 
Preparation Association 10 
25 June 1976 Kōno Group   LDP  New Liberal Club 6 
18 Jun 1993 Takemura Group  LDP  NPH 10 
15 April 1994 Kano Group  LDP  Shintō Mirai 5 
18 April 1994 Arai Group  LDP  Liberal Party  5 
26 December 1996 Hata Group New Frontier party Taiyōtō (Sun Party) 10 
         
Source: Various issues of Kokkai Binran and Seiji Handobukku; Imai 2000; Narita (2003, 72); Thies 2002. 
 
Irrelevant cases  
Irrelevant cases are cases in the universe, which do not fit the three criteria as 
mentioned earlier. There are two main types of irrelevant cases: a party defections that 
are not factional defection from a dominant party (Irrelevant Case Type I), and prominent 
                                                 
8 For group defection, only size of more than 4 legislators is considered. There were a lot of new parties 
formed after NFP split but this is not considered because the party was dissolved and did not continue to 
exist. The formation of the NFP on 10 December 1994 and the Minseitō on 23 January 1998 are not 
considered as both are cases of fusion, that is, the formation of new parties from existing parties. 




factional cases whereby intense factional dissent occurs but without any party defection 
(Irrelevant Case Type II).   
Irrelevant Case Type I comprises three categories of party defection that do not 
belong to the category of factional defection from a dominant party (table 3-3).10 The first 
category is factional defection from non-dominant ruling parties. Cases include the 
Shidehara factional defection from the Democratic Party (28 November 1947), the 
Hatoyama AMFC defection from the Liberal Party (24 November 1954), defection of the 
24 Socialist Democratic Party members to form the Democratic Party of Japan (hereafter, 
DPJ) (September 1996), and the Liberal Party’s Ogi factional defection to form the 
Conservative Party (5 April 2000). 11  The second category is group defection from 
dominant party like the Kōno Group defection in 1976 from the LDP and the Takemura 
Group defection from the LDP (18 June 1993). The third category is factional defection 
and group defection from the opposition parties. Factional defection cases from 
opposition parties include the Nishio Suehiro factional defection from the Japan Socialist 
Party (hereafter, JSP) on October 1959, the Inukai factional defection from the 
Democratic Party on 10 February 1950, and the Hata factional defection from the New 
Frontier party to form the Taiyōtō on 26 December 1996.12 The numerous defections 
after the 1996 Lower House election from the opposition parties to the upcoming LDP 
also fall under this category (see Kato and Yamamoto 2005). 
                                                 
10 Fission is a “collective reaffiliation strategy in which a minority group of politicians breaks away from an 
established party to form a new party (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003, 79). “Party switching occurs when a 
politician reaffiliates with another existing party. Both exit and entry parties have to been in existence for at 
least one election prior to the switch (ibid, 78).” 
11 The Japan New Party split off from the NPH-Japan New Party alliance on 8 April 1994, was a not a party 
split but rather an alliance split. In addition, the defection of the 14 member faction led by Hatoyama Kunio 
from New Party Harbinger in 1996, was not chosen because it was a series of individual defection that 
occurred over a period of one month. 
12 For works on party defection in the opposition parties in post-1993 Japan, see Imai (2000), Kimura (1998, 




Irrelevant Case Type II comprises the well-known cases of intra-LDP factional 
dissent coupled with explicit defection threats but did not result in eventual party 
defection. There were numerous intra-party factional conflicts within the LDP during its 
38 years of one-party dominance because the idea of “splitting of the LDP and the 
creating of a non-LDP coalition government…” was one of the constant “themes” in 
Japanese political history (Christensen 2000, 137). Such intra-party crises usually occur 
during periods of LDP electoral decline,13 when a key faction is dissatisfied with the post 
distribution,14 when new parties are formed,15 as a tool for power struggle bargaining,16 
or for other reasons.17 These cases are not used in this thesis as there is no way to 
systematically operationalize these cases. In addition, it is difficult to distinguish the 
intention of such cases because these cases of “near party defection” may be intrinsic 
(whereby there were specific plans to defect from party) or instrumental (using the threat 
of party defection as a bargaining tool during intra-party office benefits bargaining). Thus, 
a focal point, the act of voice during the no-confidence motion, is chosen to 
operationalize the concept of near party defection. 
3.1.2 Variables and Operationalization 
This section explains the operationalization of the model’s three propositions and 
the strength of the thesis’ operationalization over other studies. Unlike Horiuchi and Tay 
                                                 
13 For instance, Nikaidō Susumu, the key aide of then Kingmaker, Tanaka Kakuei, threatened to defect 
from LDP after the poor performance of LDP in the 1983 Lower House election prompted (Christensen 
2000, 148-50; Wolfe 1999, 399). 
14 For instance, Naksone Yasuhiro, the Nakasone factional leader, also contemplated leading his Nakasone 
faction to defect from LDP to merged with the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) in 1966 (Christensen 2000, 
137). 
15 For instance, the formation of the DSP in 1960 created a window of opportunity for the key LDP 
factional leader, Kōno Ichirō, to lead his Kōno faction to defect from the LDP in August 1960 (ibid). 
16 For instance, the key political maverick, Miki Takeo, threatened to lead his Miki faction to defect from 
LDP in November 1974 if he did not win the LDP presidency (ibid, 143-6). 
17  For instance, shortly after 1990 Lower House Election, Kanemaru Shin, the kingmaker of LDP, 
attempted to split LDP and form a new party with the centrist parties and the dissidents of the Socialist 




(2004), this thesis provides a more systematic way of operationalization of the 
independent variables. There are two control variables. First, the country effects have 
been controlled by choosing a single country, that is, Japan. In addition, the institutional 
effect is controlled by focusing only on the faction’s strategic calculations in the Lower 
House. Most legislative studies on Japanese politics focus on the Lower House as it is 
constitutionally precedent over the Upper House. Second, the party ideological and 
policy orientation is controlled by focusing on conservative dominant parties as there 
were no socialist dominant parties in post-war Japan. Of this, only two key conservative 
parties are focused upon: the Liberal Party from 1945 to 1955 and the LDP from 1955 to 
2003.18 
The dependent variable in this study is factional defection from dominant parties 
in Japan. This is operationalized by tracking the dominant party factional defection from 
1945 to 2003. A dichotomous measurement is taken. If factional defection occurs, the 
dependent variable is coded as 1. If no party defection occurs, the dependent variable will 
be coded as 0.  
 I operationalize the model’s three propositions into three independent variables 
with a dichotomous measurement. If the condition is validated to be true, it is coded 1; 
otherwise, coded 0. Using binary coding allows easy operationalization but the main 
disadvantage is that in reality it may be a range of values or probabilities rather just two 
values, 1 or 0. I leave this for future research. 
(1)  In the inter-party arena, proposition 1 states that a dominant party faction 
is not necessarily more likely to defect  when its dominant party’s relative Lower House 
                                                 
18 The conservative parties held the reins of power throughout these 48 years except for a mere 21 months – 
the 10 months Katayama Cabinet (30 May 1947 to 8 March 1948) and the 11 months Murayama Cabinet (9 




seat share is smaller. In other words, the breakup of a dominant party may or may not be 
more likely if the dominant party’s Lower House seat share has declined. This 
proposition is operationalize by measuring the dominant party’s Lower House seat share 
in the two most recent consecutive elections. The dominant party must have a minimum 
of 50 percent seat share before including the conservative independent legislators. If the 
dominant party’s Lower House seat share in the last Lower House election has declined 
as compared with the previous Lower House election, it will be coded as 1, otherwise 0. 
The proposition is validated if the dichotomous values for the positive and negative cases 
are 1. The non-variance of this variable will show that the Lower House seat share is not 
a unique predictor of factional defection from dominant party. 
 (2)  In the intra-party arena, proposition 2 states that a dominant party faction 
is more likely to defect when some factions within the party are more marginalized in 
intra-party competition. This proposition is operationalize by measuring the AMFC’s 
intra-party representation, that is, the proportion of the ruling party’s total Lower House 
and Upper House held by the AMFC. The seat share in both houses must be taken into 
account because this matters in the intra-party presidential race. To win this intra-party 
presidential race, the factions must form a factional coalition with a higher representation 
than the other factional coalition.19  The AMFC is marginalized if it cannot form a 
winning factional coalition even if the largest faction, excluding the party president 
faction, joins it. If the AMFC is marginalized, it will be coded as 1, otherwise 0. The 
proposition is validated if the dichotomous value for the positive cases is 1 while 0 for the 
negative cases. 
                                                 
19 There is no need to form a factional coalition with more than 50 percent of the ruling party seat share in 





As LDP factions are generally non-ideological in nature, it is plausible for the key 
LDP factions to form any combination of the winning inter-factional coalition. The 
largest non-party president faction is chosen because first, the party president faction 
aims to keep the MFC’s integrity in order to maintain control of the dominant party hence 
it is unlikely to join the AMFC to make it into the new winning inter-factional coalition. 
Second, the largest non-party presidential faction is most likely to be the core of the next 
winning intra-party factional coalition to win the party presidency. As factional size 
matters in the intra-party presidency race, the largest non-party president faction has the 
size advantage, this faction is the one that is most likely to form a new inter-factional 
coalition with the AMFC. Because the focus of this thesis is whether the losing factional 
coalition will have a chance to win the future intra-party factional bargaining, I have 
chosen the most parsimonious measurement, that is, to measure the AMFC’s level of 
marginalization within the intra-party competition based on its seat share vis-à-vis the 
MFC’s seat share.  
There are two other possible measurement in the mainstream literature. First, the 
use of power indices (Boucek 2001; 2003), which is a quantitative measurement of the 
coalition potential of various permutations of each coalition combination. This 
measurement is not necessary because the dominant party’s factional structure is simple 
with only five factions. The second possible measurement is the proportion of posts that 
the particular faction receives with respect to its seat share (Bouissou 2001; Chambers 
2003; Leiserson 1968; Mershon 2001). 20  The logic of this measurement is that the 
distribution of the office benefits (e.g., the cabinet posts and the government posts) is 
                                                 
20 Bouissou (2001) uses the cabinet post index while Leiserson (1968) uses simple proportionality index. 
For instance, Chambers (2003) argues that a faction might defect if the posts (cabinet or party posts) are not 




proportional to the seat share held by the factional coalition. This is not used because 
there is no variance. The MFC, as the winner of the intra-party coalition game, tends to 
get a higher proportion of office benefits than what its proportion of seat share entails. As 
the distribution of the office benefits is a zero sum game, consequently, the AMFC’s 
share of office benefits is lesser than what its seat share proportion entails. In addition, 
this measurement misses the crux of intra-party competition for office benefits. This 
measurement portrays a static view and ignores the bargaining horizons of the factional 
coalition that are governed by anticipation. As what proposition 2 posits, forming the 
winning factional coalition will ensure that this factional coalition secure a 
disproportional share of office benefits. Consequently, if the AMFC loses now, it can still 
be expect to win if it is able to form the next intra-party winning coalition. This will in 
turn ensure that it gets a higher proportion share of office benefits than its proportion of 
seat share.  
 (3)  Proposition 3 states that a dominant party faction is more likely to defect 
when the chance of nominating a single alternative prime ministerial candidate is higher. 
This is operationalized by the presence of either conditions mentioned below during the 
period between the last Lower House election and the impending no-confidence motion 
vote. The two conditions are: 
 Important votes in the Lower House (i.e., punishment vote of the prime 
minister and important cabinet members). A successful coordination is defined as 
the situation whereby the dominant party’s AMFC legislators cooperated with the 
opposition parties in such votes against the dominant party. The votes excludes 




policies) as policy conflict is a constant in political parties hence there is no 
variance (For detailed explanation, refer to section 2.3 and 2.5.2). 
 An impending change of the rules of the game (i.e., electoral reform or 
constitutional amendment that can affect party competition). A successful 
coordination is defined as the situation whereby there is an impending change in 
the rules of game (Boix 1999; Diaz-Cayeros and Beatriz 2001). The change in 
the rules of the game changes the incentive structure of all the legislators. This 
offers a window of opportunity for the AMFC and the opposition parties to oust 
the existing ruling government from power (For detailed explanation of the 
effects of the no-confidence motion and the prime ministerial election on the 
window of opportunity, refer to section 2.3 and 2.5.2). 
 If either of this condition is present, it will be coded as 1, otherwise 0. The 
proposition is validated if the dichotomous value for factional defection cases is 1 while 0 
for the non-factional defection cases. 
3.1.3 Data Sources   
The quantitative data for the party strengths and the factional strengths are taken 
from official sources. Party strength data is taken from various issues of the Kokkai 
Binran (The Diet Handbook), the Seiji Handobukku (The Political Handbook), Shimizu 
(1978), and newspaper sources (i.e., the main Japanese dailies like Asahi Shinbun, 
Yomiuri Shinbun and Mainichi Shinbun). The Kokkai Binran and the Seiji Handobukku 
are widely used sources of data on the Japanese legislature in the literature. Quantitative 
factional data (1955-2003) is also easily found in the Kokkai Binran and the Seiji 




but factional data from the immediate post war period is harder to find and less reliable. 
The data found are the only ones available (i.e., Watanabe 1958; 1964; 1967; Tsutsui 
1986; Mikuriya 1987; various issues of Asahi Nenkan and Yomiuri Nenkan, and various 
newspapers sources). 
The qualitative data for the cases are taken from a variety of English and Japanese 
sources like biographies, newspapers, reports, and almanacs (various issues of Mainichi 
Nenkan and Yomiuri Nenkan). The narratives of the immediate post war politics from 
1945 to 1955 are based on (Watanabe 1958; 1964; 1967), Tsutsui (1986), and Mikuriya 
(1987), the dominant party period from 1955 to 1993 are based on Christensen (2000), 
Johnson (2000), and Kohno (1997); and the post 1993 period (from 1993 to 2003) are 
based on the edited volumes of Tōdai Hō Kabashima Ikuo Zemi (1998; 2000), and Narita 
(2003). 
 
3.2 Japanese Politics (1945-2003) 
Japan is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliamentary government. 
The executive branch is headed by the prime minister who is responsible to the 
legislature. The prime minister is designated by the legislature in the prime ministerial 
election, who will then form the cabinet. Subsequently, he will be appointed as the prime 
minister by the Emperor. The Japanese legislature, also known as the Diet, is divided into 
two houses, the House of Representatives (Lower House) and the House of Councilors 
(Upper House). Conservative political parties have ruled Japan for 58 years since 1945 
except for two short periods, the 10 months Katayama Cabinet (30 May 1947 to 8 March 




3.2.1 Inter-party Dynamics (1945-2003) 
There are three main phases in Japanese politics, the immediate post-war period 
(1945-1955), the one-party dominant period (1955-1993) and the coalition government 
period (1993-2003). The LDP dominated Japanese party politics from 1955 to 1993 and 
held the Lower House majority throughout its rule despite a vote share that fell below the 
50 percent mark since the 1967 Lower House election. The four cases of analysis in this 
chapter occurred in each of these three phases. The 1953 Hatoyama AMFC defection 
occurred in the first phase, the 1980 Fukuda AMFC non-defection and the 1993 Hata 
factional defection occurred in the second phase, while the 2000 Katō AMFC non-
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21 The seat share of the opposition parties exclude the JCP. 




The first phase covers the immediate post war period (1945-1955) whereby 
politics centered on three main parties: the conservative camp’s Liberal Party and 
Progressive Reform Party -Democratic Party lineage, and the socialist camp’s Japan 
Socialist Party (hereafter, JSP).22 The Liberal Party’s Shidehara Kijūrō formed the first 
government in 1945 immediately after the end of World War II. After the first postwar 
democratic election in 1946, the Liberal Party’s Yoshida Shigeru formed a conservative 
ruling coalition (Liberal Party-Japan Progressive Party) in May 1946. In the 1947 Lower 
House election, the JSP became the largest party and formed a coalition with the second 
largest party, the Democratic Party in May 1947. The JSP’s Katayama Tetsu formed a 
cabinet (May 1947 – March 1948) followed by Democratic Party’s Ashida Hitoshi 
(March 1948 – October 1948). After a series of scandals that plagued the coalition, the 
Liberal Party’s Yoshida Shigeru took over the government again by forming a minority 
ruling government in October 1948. In the 1949 Lower House election, the Liberal Party 
became the first party in post-war Japan to secure a majority of 56.7 percent Lower 
House seat share. Subsequently, the Liberal Party remained the largest single dominant 
party for the next five years.23 In 1951, the return of the de-purged politicians to the 
political parties created intense intra-party power struggle in the parties. Within the 
Liberal Party, the de-purged Hatoyama Ichirō formed the AMFC to compete against the 
                                                 
22 The Progressive-Democratic Party lineage originated from the Japan Progressive Party (2 November 
1945) and was renamed the Democratic Party (31 March 1947). After a merger with another party, it was 
renamed the People’s Democratic Party (28 April 1950) and finally became the Progressive Reform Party 
(11 February 1952). 
23 The Liberal Party’s party strength grew from the 1949 Lower House election of 56.7 percent to a peak of 
61.8 percent Lower House seat share in February 1950 by absorbing defectors from other parties. In 
contrast, the JSP and the Democratic Party suffered great losses in the 1949 Lower House election with 14 




Yoshida MFC.24 In an attempt to cripple the AMFC, Yoshida called for a snap election in 
October 1952. Largely because of the MFC-AMFC electoral competition, the Liberal 
Party managed to secure only a bare majority of 51.5 percent of Lower House seat share, 
a 9 percent drop from its pre-election seat share. Intra-party factional fighting worsened 
and culminated with the eventual defection of the Hatoyama AMFC on 14 and 15 March 
1953 to form the Hatoyama Liberal Party. Consequently, the Liberal Party lost its Lower 
House majority in the 1953 election and formed a minority government with 42.4 percent 
seat share. After a series of negotiations, majority of the Hatoyama Liberal Party 
members returned to Liberal Party but the AMFC defected again and merged with the 
Progressive Reform Party to form the second largest opposition party, the Japan 
Democratic Party. The Japan Democratic Party emerged as the largest party after the 
1955 Lower House election, and formed the new cabinet with Hatoyama Ichirō as the 
prime minister. 
The second phase of the Japanese political development was marked by two 
historical mergers: the merger of the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party into 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the re-merger of the Left-JSP and the Right-JSP 
into the JSP in 1955. The LDP held a strong majority of 63.7 percent seat share, which 
was almost twice of the largest opposition party, the JSP’s 33.4 percent seat share. 
Contrary to the then expectations that such a merger would not have lasted, the LDP was 
able to sustain its dominance for the next 38 years until the 1993 Hata factional defection. 
After 21 years of winning the Lower House majority, the LDP lost its majority in the 
                                                 
24 Hatoyama Ichirō was an eminent politician since pre-World War II period.  He was suppose to be the 
Prime minister of the Liberal Party in 1945 but was purged by the US Occupation Authorities. Nevertheless, 
he retained his power with his remaining followers in Liberal Party. For details of the political development 




1976 Lower House election but continued to rule by absorbing independent conservative 
legislators to make up the majority.25 This lack of majority continued until the 1980 
Lower House election whereby the LDP won a 55.6 percent majority. Subsequently, it 
lost its majority again in 1983 with 48.9 percent, regained the 58.6 percent majority in the 
1986 election and maintained the majority in the 1990 election with 53.7 percent of 
Lower House seat share. During this period, the opposition parties were further disunited 
with the formation of two new main opposition parties, the conservative Democratic 
Socialist Party (hereafter, DSP) and the centrist Clean Government Party (hereafter, CGP) 
in the mid-1960s. The LDP’s dominance continued until 1993 whereby the Hata factional 
defection from LDP caused it to lose power. 
The third phase of Japanese politics was marked with the start of a new generation 
of coalition governments that took place between the established parties from the second 
phase – the LDP, the JSP, the CGP, the DSP – and the new parties formed in the third 
phase – the Japan New Party (hereafter, JNP), the New Party Harbinger (hereafter, NPH), 
and the Japan Renewal Party (hereafter, JRP).26 After been out of power for merely 10 
months, the LDP regained power and faced a split opposition. Two key opposition parties 
emerged at different times – the New Frontier Party (hereafter, NFP) and then the DPJ. 
After the 1993 Lower House election, a seven-party non-LDP ruling coalition was 
formed with Hosokawa Morihiro (leader of the JNP, then the fifth largest party) as the 
prime minister.27 A series of prominent bills were passed, the most important being the 
                                                 
25 In 1976, the small Kōno group defected to form the New Liberal Club but this did not greatly affect the 
LDP’s Lower House strength. 
26 The JNP was formed by a Hosokawa Morihiro, a ex-LDP Upper House legislator. The LDP’s Takemura 
Group formed the NPH while the LDP’s Hata faction formed the JRP. Both groups defected from LDP in 
June 1993. 
27 The seven parties are the JNP, NPH, JRP, Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), DSP, Social 




electoral reform bill which changed the previous single non-transferable vote (SNTV) 
system to a mixed electoral system. This coalition lasted only for seven months before 
the two-month JRP’s Hata Tsutomu minority cabinet took over. Making use of the rift 
among the ruling coalition parties, the opposition LDP convinced the Social Democratic 
Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the NPH to form a new ruling coalition. SDPJ’s Murayama 
Tomiichi became the new prime minister in June 1994. For the first time since 1948, 
another Socialist leader took over the prime minister post. The Murayama cabinet 
resigned and was replaced by LDP’s Hashimoto Ryūtarō in January 1996.  
The opposition parties re-aligned and merged into a single party, the New Frontier 
Party (NFP) in November 1994. Subsequently, the NFP quickly faltered off after it lost 
the Lower House election in October 1996. For the ruling coalition, the devastating losses 
of LDP’s coalition partners, the SDPJ and the NPH, in the 1996 Lower House election 
forced the two parties to leave the ruling coalition. Thereafter, the LDP ruled singly for 
the next two years with the SDPJ and the NPH providing legislative support. A group of 
SDPJ and NPH legislators defected to form the DPJ just before the 1996 Lower House 
election. The DPJ gradually grew to become the largest opposition party while the NFP 
was subsequently dissolved with most of its members joining either the largest party, the 
LDP or the largest opposition party, the DPJ. The LDP gradually recovered its party 
strength by absorbing the opposition party and independent legislators. Hashimoto 
stepped down from LDP presidency after the the LDP’s defeat in the 1998 Upper House 
election and was taken over by Obuchi Kezō. Obuchi remained prime minister until his 
death in 2000. During his prime ministership, Obuchi formed the LDP-Liberal Party 




Subsequently, in April 2000, the Liberal Party broke up with the defection of the Ozawa 
faction and the Liberal Party remnants remained within the coalition by forming the 
Conservative Party. Mori Yoshirō took over and the LDP formed a coalition government 
with the CGP and the Conservative Party. This coalition was maintained for the 
subsequent Lower House Election in June 2000 and November 2003. Mori was 
extremely unpopular and was replaced by Koizumi Junichirō in April 2001.  
3.2.2 Intra-party Dynamics (1945-2003) 
 Factions played a great role in Japanese politics and at times more important than 
the parties did. Factions formed factional coalition to fight for the party presidency. This 
sub-section seeks to explain the factional dynamics within the conservative parties.  
Factional dynamics in the immediate post war period (1945-1955) was less 
structured than the LDP’s factional dynamics in the post 1955 period. The Liberal Party 
was dominated by the pro-Hatoyama Ichirō’s factions in the formative years but the 
purge of Hatoyama Ichirō and his allies provided the political space for the rise of the 
pro-Yoshida Shigeru factions (Sakano 1948, 75-81). Yoshida built his support base 
appointing ex-bureaucrats to key party and cabinet posts. By 1949, the strength of the 
Yoshida MFC and the Hatoyama AMFC were fairly even (Tōkyō Taimusu, 25 August 
1952). The return of Hatoyama Ichirō to the Liberal Party in 1951 crystallized the 
factional structure around the Yoshida MFC and the Hatoyama AMFC. The series of 
intra-Liberal Party factional conflict between these two factional coalition resulted in the 
eventual Liberal Party’s declining seat share in the 1952 and 1953 election, and the 
eventual defection of the Hatoyama AMFC in March 1953. Subsequently, the Hatoyama 




party, the Japan Democratic Party. Consequently, the Liberal Party and the Japan 
Democratic Party merged to form the LDP in 1955. 
The LDP was formed in 1955 by two factionalized parties, the Liberal Party and 
the Japan Democratic Party. There are four generations of LDP factions between 1955 
and 2003 (Hiroshi 2005, 174). The LDP factional system serves three main functions, 
endorsement of LDP candidates, as a source of politics funds, and the distribution of 
office benefits (Park 2001, 433-6). The LDP factional dynamics remained similar even 
after the 1994 electoral reform except for the decreased factional role in determining 
party endorsement (Köllner 2004, 93-4). The line of division of factional politics mainly 
centered on the forming of a winning inter-factional coalition from 1955 to 2003. 
The first generation of the LDP factions was known as the “Yatsu no Gundan” 
(the “Eight Corps”) because there were eight key factions: the Ikeda faction, the Satō 
faction, the Ogata faction, the Ōno faction, the Kishi faction, the Kōno faction, the 
Ishibashi faction, and the Matusmura-Miki faction in 1955 (table 3-4). The factional 
structure gradually evolved and five main factions remained until 2003. Factions from 
these five factional lineages, the Ikeda faction, the Satō faction, the Kōno faction, the 
Kishi faction and the Miki faction shaped LDP politics. These five factions formed 
different winning inter-factional coalitions throughout the 48 years to secure the LDP 
party presidency from 1956 to 2003. Securing the party presidency was tantamount to 
securing the prime minister post. The Satō-Tanaka lineage played a critical role on LDP 
politics and throughout most of LDP’s rule, no prime ministerial candidate can be elected 




The second factional generation is known as the “Sankakudaifukuchū” that 
centered on the rivalry between two key LDP factional leaders, Tanaka Kakuei of the 
Tanaka faction and Fukuda Takeo of the Fukuda faction. The series of the factional 
competition between the two factional coalition led by each of them culminated into the 
1980 no-confidence motion. 
  
Table 3-4. The Lineage of LDP's Big Five factions, 1956-2003 
Year 
Yoshida 
Shigeru* Yoshida Shigeru* Kōno Ichirō Kishi Nobusuke Miki Takeo 
 1st Generation Yatsu no Gundan    
1956 Satō Eisaku Ikeda Hayato    
1961      
1963  Maeo Shigesaburo 
Nakasone 
Yasuhiro   
1971  Ōhira Masayoshi    
      
 2nd Generation Sankakudaifukuchū    
1972 Tanaka Kakuei   Fukuda Takeo Miki Takeo 
1980  Suzuki Zenko   
Kōmoto 
Toshio** 
      
 3rd Generation Nyūrīdā    
1986  Miyazawa Kiichi  Abe Shintarō  
1987 
Takeshita 
Noboru     
1989   
Watanabe 
Michio   





Obuchi Keizō     
      
 4th Generation MYKK    
1998  Katō Kōichi 
Murakami 
Masakuni Mori Yosiro  
1999   
Eto 
Takami/Kamei 
Shizuka   
2000 
Hashimoto 
Ryūtarō    
 
2001  Horiuchi Mitsuo    
2003      
Source: Park 2001, 434; Hiroshi 2005, 174 
* The pre-LDP Yoshida faction split into two factions with the party's forming. 






The taking over of factional leadership by Abe Shintarō and Miyazawa Kiichi in 
the mid-1980s, followed by Takeshita Noboru marked the start of the third factional 
generation. These three leaders were called the “Nyūrīdā” (“the New Leaders”). The 
Takeshita faction remained the largest LDP faction and no LDP president could be 
elected without the faction’s support. Takeshita took over the prime ministership before 
the two other leaders. Abe and Miyazawa were supposed to take over Takeshita but their 
implication in the Recruit Scandal allowed Uno Sōsuke (Nakasone faction) to become the 
prime minister in June 1989. The subsequent implication of Uno in a scandal saw Kaifu 
Toshiki from the small Kōmoto faction taking over the prime ministership in August 
1989. In 1990, Watanabe Michio took over factional leadership while Mitsuzuka Hiroshi 
took over the Abe faction after Abe’s death in 1991. The implication of LDP’s most 
powerful kingmaker, Kanemaru Shin (Takeshita faction), in the Sagawa scandal split the 
Takshita faction into the Obuchi faction and the Hata faction. Hata faction eventually 
defected from the LDP to form a new party in the 1993 case. Nevertheless, the factional 
structure and dynamics remained similar. Kōno Yōhei (Miyazawa faction) took over LDP 
presidency from Miyazawa Kiichi (Miyazawa faction), and was replaced by Hashimoto 
Ryūtarō (Obuchi faction) in September 1995. 
After the LDP’s defeat in the 1998 Upper House Election, Hashimoto stepped 
down and was replaced by Obuchi Keizō (Obuchi faction) in the later half of 1998. This 
marked the start of the fourth factional generation, the “MYKK” (Mori Yoshiro, 
Yamazaki Taku, Koizumi Junichirō, and Katō Kōichi). Mori Yoshiro took over the 




took over the remnants of the Watanabe faction. The 2000 case occurred during this 
phase. 
 
3.3 The Cases 
This thesis builds on the two cases (one positive case and one negative case) 
analyzed in Horiuchi and Tay (2004) by adding another positive case and negative case. 
These are the only relevant cases from Japan. Except for the 1993 case, the rest of the 
cases have not been systematically analyzed with a coherent model. These cases are the 
1953 no-confidence motion (Nakakita 2002; Watanabe 1958; 1964), the 1980 no-
confidence motion (e.g., Curtis 1999; Nakamura 1983; Soma 1982; Togawa 1982), and 
the 2000 no-confidence motion (Park 2001; Narita 2003; Tsuchiya 2000). The 1993 case 
is the most well analyzed factional defection case. The works on this case comprises the 
quantitative approach (e.g., Cox and Rosenbluth 1995; Kato 1998; Reed and Scheiner 
2003; Tatebayashi 2002) and the qualitative approach (e.g., Asahi Seiji-bu 1993; Curtis 
1999; Bettcher 2002; Itō 1997; Kohno 1997; Narita 1997; Otake 1996; Sasaki 1999; 
Yomiuri Seiji-bu 1993). 
3.3.1 Positive Case: 1953 Hatoyama AMFC Defection 28  
This is the one of the most significant political event in the immediate post war 
Japanese politics (1945-1955) because it marked the start of the demise of Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru’s dominance within the Liberal Party. On 14 March 1953, 22 Hatoyama 
AMFC legislators defected from the Liberal Party and another 15 of its legislators 
                                                 
28 Although the Hirokawa faction defected one day later than the rest of the Hatoyama factional coalition, 
the analysis of the incentive structure for its defection is taken to be the same as it was part of the 




defected on the next day. The Liberal Party dominated the Japanese politics from 1949 to 
1953 after it won a resounding 56.7 percent of seat share in the 1949 Lower House 
election. The Liberal Party’s seat share increased to 61.8 percent after a merger with the 
Democrat Pro-coalition Party on 10 February 1950.  
The return of the Liberal Party depurgees led by Hatoyama in 1951 intensified the 
intra-Liberal Party factional infighting. After the end of the World War II, the U.S. 
Occupation authorities purged numerous people who had direct links in the Japanese war 
efforts, like the right-wing politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. The purging of the 
politicians allowed the rise of a new generation of post-war Japanese politicians. The 
subsequent return of these depurged politicians created intra-Liberal Party tensions 
because these depurged politicians sought to regain the political power lost before the 
purge. The return of Hatoyama Ichirō and his political allies like Miki Bukichi, Ishbiashi 
Tanzan and Kōno Ichirō provided a rallying point for the Liberal Party’s anti-Yoshida 
Shigeru factions. Thereafter, the factional competition structure crystallized into the 
Yoshida Shigeru led MFC-Hatoyama Ichirō led AMFC rivalry. The intensified factional 
infighting resulted in Liberal Party’s Lower House seat share being reduced to a slim 
majority of 51.5 percent in the 1952 Lower House election. The factional infighting 
continued and culminated into the Hatoyama AMFC’s defection in 1953. 
The no-confidence motion vote was passed on 14 March 1953 with a difference 
of 11 votes (table 3-5). The Hatoyama AMFC defected before the no-confidence motion 
vote while another ten Lower House legislators from the Liberal Party were absent. On 
the day of the no-confidence motion vote, the Liberal Party held 222 seats (47.6 percent 




Lower House seat share) hence if the Hatoyama AMFC (4.7 percent of Lower House seat 
share) did not defect, the no-confidence motion might not have been passed. 
 
Table 3-5. Votes during the 1953 No-confidence Motion (14 March 1953) 
 
Number of Lower 
House  seats Vote for Vote Against Absent 
Liberal Party  222 0 212 10 
Others 244 229 6 9 
Total 466 229 218 19 
Source: Asahi Shinbun, 15 March 1953; Mainichi Shinbun, 15 March 1953. 
 
All the model’s propositions are validated. Proposition 1 is validated because the 
Liberal Party’s Lower House seat share has declined from 56.7 percent to 51.5 percent in 
the 1949 and the 1952 Lower House election respectively (figure 3-1). This sharp decline 
was due to the intense factional infighting in Liberal Party that resulted in the strong 
electoral competition between Liberal Party candidates in the same electoral districts in 
the 1952 Lower House election. In contrast, the opposition parties, excluding the Japan 
Communist Party (hereafter, JCP), made electoral gains from 35.8 percent in the 1949 
Lower House election to 48.5 percent in the 1952 Lower House election.29 The Lower 
House seat share gap between the Liberal Party and the opposition parties narrowed from 
20.9 percent (1949 Lower House election) to 3.0 percent (1952 Lower House election). 
Nevertheless, the opposition parties remained splintered, The largest opposition party, the 
Progressive Reform Party held only 18.2 percent Lower House seat share while the next 
two largest opposition parties, held only 23.8 percent Lower House seat share. On the day 
before the no-confidence motion vote, if the Hatoyama AMFC (with a representation of 
4.7 percent of Lower House seat share) has not defected, the no-confidence motion would 
                                                 
29 The Progressive Reform Party gained another 4.5 percent of Lower House seat share while the two 




not have passed. This is because the Liberal Party would have held 52.4 percent (244 
seats) of Lower House seat share, which is 4.7 percent more than opposition parties’ 
(excluding the JCP) 47.6 percent (222 seats).30  
Proposition 2 is validated because the Hatoyama AMFC was marginalized. It held 
only 28.8 percent of Liberal Party’s Lower House seat, which is almost two-third of the 
MFC’s 43.3 percent in 1953 (table 3-6).31 The MFC comprised the Bureaucrats faction, 
the Inner Circle faction, the Executive Committee faction, the Hayashi faction, the Inukai 
faction, the Ikeda faction, the Ogata faction, the Masuda faction, and the Satō faction; 
while the AMFC comprised the Hatoyama faction, the Hirokawa faction, the ex-
Hirokawa faction, the Ishibashi faction, the Kishi faction, and the Ōno faction (Tōkyō 
Taimusu, 2 January 1954). 32  The main cause of this marginalization is the MFC’s 
monopolization of the Liberal Party apparatus. These had two effects. First, the 
deprivation of posts to the Hatoyama AMFC thereby reduce the survivability of the 
factions within the MFC. This is evident by the gradual decline of the Hatoyama AMFC 
intra-party strength after 1949 (Kataoka 1991, 106, 112). As the MFC controls the key 
party mechanisms, the MFC largely determines the distribution of office benefits. Only 
the MFC legislators held cabinet posts hence those who belonged to the AMFC were 
deprived of cabinet posts (Farnsworth 1963, 73-6; Komiya 2005).33 Second, the Liberal 
Party factional structure was rigid hence factions within the factional coalitions cannot 
                                                 
30 The 55.6 percent seat share includes that of the Hatoyama AMFC before its defection.  
31 Although, the total Lower House and Upper House seat share must be taken for the factional strengths, 
only the Lower House factional strength is taken because the factional dynamics in the Lower House is 
different from the Upper House.  
32 Hirokawa Kōzen was the leader of the most powerful Liberal Party faction, Hirokawa faction. He was 
the main supporter of Yoshida Shigeru in Yoshida’s early days of power but Hirokawa withdrew his 
support from Yoshida after some conflicts that arose from the allocation of office benefits . 
33 While the Hatoyama AMFC secured two cabinet posts in the second and third Yoshida cabinet (October 
1948 to October 1952), it secured no posts in the fourth Yoshida cabinet (October 1952 to March 1953) 




easily switch to another factional coalition. Thus, although the neutral factions held a 
substantial 27.9 percent of Lower House seat share and could have aligned with the 
AMFC, this was not viable because any alliance with the AMFC might deprived them of 
office benefits. Consequently, the AMFC could not form an alternative factional coalition 
with other factions.  
 
Table 3-6. Representation of the Factional Coalition in the Liberal Party (1949-1952)  
 1949  August 1952  October 1952 
Yoshida MFC  41.8 49.1 43.3 
Hatoyama AMFC 41.9 41.8 28.8 
Neutral Factions  9.1 9.1 27.9 
Others 6.3 0 0 
(% of Liberal Party seat share in the Lower House only) 
Source: Tōkyō Taimusu, 25 August 1952, Asahi Shinbun, 2 October 1952  
 
Proposition 3 is validated because there were two successful Liberal Party 
AMFC-opposition party coordination experiences between the 1952 Lower House 
election and the 1953 no-confidence motion vote. The two successful coordination efforts 
were the Ikeda Punishment Resolution (28 November 1952) and the Prime Minister 
Yoshida Punishment Resolution (2 March 1953). In 1952, Ikeda Hayato, who was one of 
the Yoshida MFC’s rising new leader, was punished in the Lower House for making 
irresponsible remarks. 34  In the passing of this punishment resolution, 25 Hatoyama 
AMFC legislators and other Liberal Party legislators cooperated with the opposition 
parties to vote for the resolution (Yomiuri Nenkan 1953, 235). The resolution was passed 
with 208 votes for and 201 votes against (Mainichi Shinbun, 29 November 1952). There 
                                                 
34 Ikeda, Minister for International Trade and Industry, commented in a Lower House session on 27 
November 1952 that it was unfortunate and unavoidable for small enterprises to be forced out of business. 
Such remarks were perceived to be inappropriate for a minister and the opposition parties made use of this 




was only a seven vote difference hence if the AMFC members did not defect from the 
Liberal Party, this motion would not have been passed.  
Subsequently, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru made a rude remark in the Lower 
House and he was subsequently subjected to a punishment resolution on 2 March 1953.35 
The number of Liberal Party dissenters increased. Eighty-eight Hatoyama AMFC 
legislators and other Liberal Party  legislators (68 Hatoyama AMFC legislators and 20 
other Liberal Party legislators) again cooperated with the opposition parties and voted for 
the passing of the motion with 191 votes for and 162 votes against (Mainichi Shinbun, 3 
March 1953). This was passed with a greater vote margin than the Ikeda Punishment 
Resolution. As the opposition parties were able to get their act together, this send a strong 
signal to the Hatoyama AMFC that the opposition parties could get their act together. By 
absenting from the two punishment votes, the Hatoyama AMFC also send a strong signal 
to the opposition parties of its willingness to cooperate with the opposition parties in the 
no-confidence motion vote (Mainichi Shinbun, 3 March 1953). 
In addition, the rise of Shigemitsu Mamoru, the leader of the largest opposition 
party, the Progressive Reform Party, opened the possibility of a joint prime ministerial 
candidate in the opposition party camp (Takeda 2002, 208-19). The Progressive Reform 
Party’s Lower House seat share steadily increased from a nadir of 64 seats in Dec 1951 to 
a peak of 89 seats after the 1952 Lower House election. The Progressive Reform Party 
and the Hatoyama AMFC after defection aimed to capture at least 100 seats each, while 
the Liberal Party expected to secure only 100 seats (Tsutsui 1986, 245). Consequently, 
the Hatoyama AMFC was expected to take the lead of the next governing coalition. 
                                                 
35 On 28 February 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida scolded an opposition party legislator, “Bakayarō (idiot)” 




Moreover, the two socialist parties (JSP-right and JSP-left) were supportive of 
Shigemitsu as the common prime ministerial candidate (Nakakita 2002, 18-19). 
3.3.2 Positive case: 1993 Hata Factional Defection   
The Hata factional defection is one the most significant political event in post war 
Japanese politics because this defection triggered the eventual collapse of the LDP’s 38 
year dominance. On 22 June 1993, the 35 men Hata faction defected from the LDP, four 
days after ten LDP legislators from the Takemura Group defected on 18 June 1993. 
Unlike previous factional defections since 1945, the Hata faction was the only faction 
that defected en bloc. After the 1986 Lower House election, the LDP’s Lower House seat 
share remained above the majority (except the 1983 Lower House election). In the intra-
party arena, the Tanaka-Takeshita factional lineage was the largest faction in the LDP 
and any new cabinet formation required its implicit support. Nonetheless, beginning from 
the late 1980s, the faction was implicated with scandals (e.g., the Recruit scandal and the 
Sagawa Express Scandal) that caused the eventual factional split in 1992. The split 
resulted in the formation of the Hata faction, led by Hata Tsutomu while Obuchi Keizō 
led the remnants of the Takeshita faction and renamed it as the Obuchi faction. 36 
Utilizing the agenda for political reform, the Hata faction sought to gain more political 
power to replace the MFC but this was met with concerted action by the MFC. 
Eventually, the Hata faction defected from LDP in June 1993. 
The no-confidence motion vote was passed on 18 June 1993 with a vote 
difference of 35 (table 3-7). Thirty-nine LDP legislators, mainly from the Hata faction, 
voted for the no-confidence motion while another 18 LDP legislators were absent. On the 
                                                 




day of the no-confidence motion vote, the LDP held a Lower House majority of 274 seats 
vis-à-vis opposition parties’ 223 seats. If the Hata faction did not vote for the no-
confidence motion, the no-confidence motion might not have been passed. 
 
Table 3-7. Votes during the 1993 No-confidence Motion (18 June 1993)37 
 Number of Lower House seats Vote for Vote Against Absent 
LDP 274 39 217 18 
Opposition parties  223 216 3 3 
Total 493 255 220 21 
Source: Asahi Shinbun, 19 June 1993. 
 
All the model’s propositions are validated. Proposition 1 is validated because the 
LDP’s Lower House seat share had declined from 58.6 percent in the 1986 Lower House 
election’s to 53.7 percent in the 1990 Lower House election (figure 3-1). The LDP seat 
share since mid-1980s, steadily increased from a low of 48.9 percent in 1983 to 58.6 
percent in 1986 and dropped slightly to 53.7 percent in 1990. The total Lower House seat 
share of the opposition parties (excluding the JCP) decreased from 45.8 percent in the 
1983 Lower House election, decreased to 36.1 percent in the 1986 Lower House election, 
and then increased to 43.2 percent in the 1990 Lower House election. The Lower House 
seat share gap between the LDP and the opposition parties (excluding the JCP) was 3.1 
percent, 22.5 percent, and 10.5 percent in the 1983, 1986 and 1990 Lower House election 
respectively. On the day of the no-confidence motion vote, the LDP held 53.6 percent 
(274 seats) of Lower House seat share, with a 13.1 percent seat share difference from the 
opposition parties’ (excluding the JCP) 40.5 percent (207 seats). Moreover, the 
                                                 
37 There were a total of 493 legislators on 18 June 1993. The total number of Lower House seats was 512 




opposition parties were divided and the largest opposition party, the JSP, was only about 
half the size of the LDP even at its peak strength.38 
Proposition 2 is validated because the AMFC, the Hata faction, was marginalized 
(Asahi Shimbun Seijibu 1993; Miyashita 1993, 24-7; Tominomori 1993, 186-7, 190; 
Yomiuri Shimbun Seijibu 1993). The AMFC comprised only the Hata faction, held 11.5 
percent of the LDP’s Lower House and Upper House seats (hereafter, defined as 
representation) while the MFC (the Obuchi faction, the Miyazawa faction, the Mitsuzuka 
faction, and the Watanabe factions), led by the Prime Minister Miyzawa Kiichi’s 
Miyazawa faction, held 74.0 percent representation (table 3-8). The key LDP factions 
formed the “San-ten-Go Taisei (the 3.5 Factional System)” and were bent on eliminating 
the Hata faction (Bettcher 2001, 139; Tominomori 1993, 186-7, 190). Assuming that the 
largest faction, the Mitsuzuka faction (19.6 percent representation), joined the Hata 
faction, the AMFC would still only have 31.1 percent representation vis-à-vis the MFC’s 
(Obuchi-Miyazawa-Watanabe factions) 54.4 percent representation. Consequently, the 
Hata faction only had two choices, remained as a marginalized LDP faction or to defect 
from the dominant party (Miyashita 1993; Yomiuri Shinbun,  19 June 1993). 
 
Table 3-8. Representation of the Factional Coalition in the LDP in June 1993 (% LDP Strength) 
 MFC    AMFC  Others 
Obuchi Miyazawa Mitsuzuka Watanabe  Hata  Others 
17.5 19.6 19.6 17.8  11.5  14.0 
Source: Seiji Handobukku  1993. 
 
Proposition 3 is validated as there was a seemingly impending change in the rules 
of the game, that is, the electoral system.39 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the LDP 
                                                 
38 The JSP’s Lower House seat share decreased from 22.3 percent in the 1983 Lower House election to16.8 
percent Lower House seat share in the 1986 Lower House election, and jumped to a 27.1 percent in the 




was implicated in a series of scandals. For instance, the Recruit Scandal of the late 1980s 
sparked a series calls for political reforms. One of the key elements of political reforms 
was changing the Single Non-Transferable Votes System (SNTV) to the mixed-member 
electoral system. This electoral system was seen as one of the key mechanisms whereby 
LDP maintained its 38 years of one-party dominance. Incumbents of the electoral system 
may lose their legislative seats after the change in the electoral system hence changing 
the electoral system will open up opportunities for the opposition parties to wrest power 
from LDP (Woodall 1999). The numerous groups formed among legislators within the 
ruling party or opposition parties, between the opposition parties and ruling party 
highlighted the conflicting incentive structure of groups of legislators (see Wolfe 1995). 
Two factors convinced Hata faction of the higher probability of political success 
after party defection. First, numerous pro-reform and anti-reform groups were formed 
within the LDP, within the opposition parties, and between the ruling party and the 
opposition parties in the early 1990s (Wolfe 1995). This had two effects: building trust 
between the opposition parties and the LDP dissident elements; and to build an 
organizational framework for cooperation, which is necessary when the LDP dissident 
elements defect and form a new party. For instance, the de facto Hata factional leader, 
Ozawa Ichirō, had close personal connections with the CGP (Asahi Shinbun Seijibu 1993, 
44-5; Bettcher 2001, 122; Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu 1993, 96-7). The CGP was the 
second largest opposition party in the Lower House holding 8.8 percent Lower House 
seat share. Thus, the Hata faction could count on the CGP as a strong ally in the post-
election inter-party coalition bargaining in the inter-party arena. Second, the successes of 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 There were no successful coordination efforts by the opposition parties between the 1990 Lower House 




a small new party, the JNP, in the 1992 Upper House election and the 1993 local 
elections in Tokyo, showed the Hata faction the likely benefits of factional defection. The 
JNP was formed by another LDP defector and was reformist in party orientation. If the 
faction defect to form a new party, the new party is likely to achieve similar success 
because of a new party label based on political reform (Bettcher 2001, 149). Japanese 
voters have been seeking alternatives to the LDP rule but did not find the existing 
opposition parties as suitable alternatives (Reed 1999, 188-9). Consequently, these voters 
may vote for such new conservative parties if these parties present themselves as viable 
alternate conservative parties to the LDP (Mair and Sakano 1998). A new party can ride 
on such a boom and secure a decent Lower House seat share in order to become a 
significant political actor in coalition bargaining. 
3.3.3 Negative Case: 1980 Fukuda AMFC Non-factional Defection  
This is the one of the most significant political event during the LDP’s one party 
dominance (1955-1993) because it was the most intense factional conflict in LDP history 
whereby a LDP split seemed imminent. On 16 May 1980, a no-confidence motion against 
the LDP was passed after the LDP’s AMFC legislators absent themselves from the no-
confidence motion vote. In the inter-party arena, plagued by the Lockheed Scandal, in the 
inter-party arena, the LDP’s seat share declined. After been the single ruling dominant 
party for nearly 25 years, the LDP faced its worst electoral losses in the late 1970s, 
dropping from the 1960s average of 60.7 percent of Lower House seat share to 50.7 
percent in the 1976 Lower House election. This decline culminated into the worst 
election results in the 1979 Lower House election whereby the LDP only secured 48.5 




also intense factional rivalry in the intra-party arena that started off from the 1972 party 
presidential rivalry between two key factional coalitions – the MFC headed by the 
Tanaka faction (led by Tanaka Kakuei) and the AMFC, headed by the Fukuda faction 
(led by Fukuda Takeo). Tanaka Kakuei beat the hot favorite, Fukuda Takeo, and this 
caused the subsequent intra-LDP conflicts. For instance, Prime Minister Ōhira's forced 
dissolution of the Diet in 1979 for early election in order to bolster the MFC’s power vis-
à-vis the AMFC, and in the 1979 prime ministerial election whereby Fukuda Takeo ran 
against the incumbent, Ōhira Masayoshi. 40  These factional conflicts in the 1970s 
eventually culminated into the 1980 no confidence motion. 
The no-confidence motion vote was passed on 16 May 1980 with a difference of 
56 votes. This was mainly due to the absence of the 73 LDP AMFC members (table 3-9). 
The LDP held only a slim majority of 50.1 percent Lower House seat share vis-à-vis the 
opposition parties’ 41.7 percent. The LDP AMFC need not vote for the no-confidence 
motion as their absence was sufficient to allow the no-confidence motion vote to pass.41 
 
Table 3-9. Votes during the 1980 No-confidence Motion (16 May 1980) 
 
Number of Lower 
House  seats Vote for Vote Against Absent 
LDP 256 0 183 73 
Others 255 243 4 5 
Total 510 243 187 78 
Source: Asahi Shinbun, 17 May 1980. 
 
                                                 
40 Fukuda Takeo broke an informal LDP norm whereby the all members must support the sole candidate of 
the LDP, by running against LDP’s officially endorsed candidate, Ōhira Masayoshi. 
41 A total of 73 LDP members were absent from the no-confidence motion vote, with 36 legislators from 
the Fukuda faction, 25 from the Miki faction, eight legislators from the Nakagawa group, two from the 





All the model’s propositions are validated. Proposition 1 is validated as the LDP’s 
seats share dropped from 50.7 percent in the 1976 Lower House election to 48.5 percent 
in the 1979 Lower House election (see figure 3-1). The LDP’s Lower House seat share in 
the 1970s has declined from a peak of 59.3 percent in the 1969 Lower House election to 
55.2 percent, 50.7 percent, and then 48.5 percent in the 1972, 1976 and 1979 Lower 
House election respectively. While the LDP weakened, the opposition parties also 
remained splintered. The total Lower House seat share of the opposition parties 
(excluding the JCP) decreased from 37.9 percent in the 1969 Lower House election to 
36.7 percent, increased to 45.4 percent, and subsequently decreased to 43.4 percent in the 
1972, 1976 and 1979 Lower House elections respectively. The Lower House seat share 
gap between the LDP and the opposition parties dwindled from 18.5 percent in the 1972 
Lower House election to 5.3 percent and 5.1 percent in the 1976 and 1979 Lower House 
election respectively. On the day of the no-confidence motion LDP’s seat share was 50.1 
percent (256 seats), which is 8.4 percent more than the opposition parties’ 41.7 percent 
(213 seats). The largest opposition party, the JSP, was never more than half the size of 
the LDP.42 As compared to 1993, there was a smaller gap between the LDP vis-à-vis the 
opposition parties, that is, 8.4 percent Lower House seat share difference in 1980 as 
compared to 13.1 percent in 1993. 
Proposition 2 is not validated as there was no marginalized key faction. The 
Fukuda led AMFC was not marginalized. In 1980, the MFC was fairly balanced against 
the AMFC. The MFC (the Tanaka faction, the Ōhira faction, and the Nakasone faction), 
led by the Tanaka faction, held 54.1 percent representation while the AMFC (the Fukuda 
                                                 
42 The JSP’s Lower House seat share was 18.5 percent in the 1969 Lower House election, increased to 24.0 
percent in the 1972 Lower House election, increased further to 24.3 percent in the 1976 Lower House 




faction, the Miki faction, and the Nakagawa group), led by the Fukuda faction, held 33.5 
percent representation (table 3-10). The largest faction was the Tanaka faction but it was 
unlikely to ally with the Fukuda faction as they were archenemies. Thus, the next 
possible faction was Nakasone faction with 11.9 percent representation. If the Nakasone 
faction joined the AMFC, its strength will be 45.4 percent representation vis-à-vis the 
MFC’s (less Nakasone faction) 42.2 percent representation.43 This means that the AMFC 
could replace the existing Tanaka-faction led MFC to gain the party presidency. In short, 
the Fukuda-led AMFC was not marginalized as it had a realistic chance of gaining power 
within LDP. This was evidenced by the presence of new potential factional leaders within 
the AMFC whom seemed likely to win the next LDP presidency. For instance, Abe 
Shintarō of the Fukuda faction and Kōmoto Toshio of the Miki faction were eying for the 
LDP presidency hence they opposed to their factional leaders’ moves to defect to from 
the LDP (Nakamura 1983, 257-9).  
 
Table 3-10. Representation of the Factional Coalition in the LDP in May 1980 (% LDP Strength) 





Funada Mizuta Fukuda Miki 
Nakaga-
wa  
21.9 18.5 11.9 1.8 1.6 19.3 10.3 2.4 12.4 
Source: Seiji Handobukku 1980. 
 
Proposition 3 is not validated as there was no successful coordination efforts by 
the opposition parties between the 1979 Lower House election and the 1980 no-
confidence motion vote. The failure of the opposition parties to nominate a single prime 
ministerial candidate showed the possibility of coordination failure. During the 1979 
                                                 
43 Nakasone was part of the Fukuda AMFC but joined the Ōhira led MFC just before the 1980 no-




prime ministerial election, the LDP nominated two prime ministerial candidates, Ōhira 
Masayoshi, who was supported by the LDP MFC, and Fukuda Takeo, who was supported 
by the LDP AMFC (table 3-11). This was an excellent opportunity for the opposition 
parties as the LDP held only 256 seats vis-à-vis the opposition parties’ 222 seats. On the 
day of the prime ministerial election, both the MFC and the AMFC each sponsored its 
own candidate. Each LDP candidate’s vote ranged from 121 to 138. Accordingly, if the 
opposition parties could nominate a single prime ministerial candidate, the opposition 
parties, with 222 votes, could have easily won the prime ministerial election and formed 
the new government. In spite of this, the opposition parties could not capitalized on this 
opportunity to nominate a common prime ministerial candidate (Ōie 1995, 230). Instead, 
the opposition parties nominated candidates from each of their own party in the first 
round and then cast spoilt votes in the second round of voting. 
 
Table 3-11. 1979 Prime Ministerial Election Vote Distribution 
Candidate Candidate’s Party 1st Round 2nd Round 
Ōhira Masayoshi LDP 135 138 
Fukuda Takeo LDP 125 121 
Asukata Ichio JSP 107 NA 
Takeiri Yoshikatsu CGP 58 NA 
Miyamoto Kenji JCP 41 NA 
Sasaki Ryosaku DSP 36 NA 
Den Hideo Shaminren 2 NA 
Blank Vote - 0 NA 
Spoilt Vote - 7 251 
Source: Asahi Shinbun, 6 November 1979; 6 November 1979 (evening edition) 7 November 1979. 
 
There are two key factors for this coordination failure. First, the opposition parties 
were dis-united. The inability of the largest opposition party, the JSP, to provide 
leadership for the opposition parties is the key reason for coordination failure among the 
opposition parties (Christensen 2000, 96-8). The JSP’s desire to maintain intra-party 




opposition parties, that is, the CGP and the DSP (Johnson 2000, 119-21). In addition, the 
DSP and the CGP, collaborated closely with the dominant party, the LDP, in local 
elections. Prime Minister Ōhira’s strategy to co-opt these two opposition parties created 
strife among the opposition parties (Christensen 2000, 146-8). This explains why despite 
the increased electoral cooperation between the opposition parties in the late 1970s, no 
coalition government was formed.44 
Second, there was minimum incentive for the AMFC to defect. Despite not 
holding a Lower House majority, the LDP (minus the defected AMFC) could easily find 
an alternative coalition partner in the event that the AMFC defects created a dilemma for 
the AMFC. In 1980, other opposition parties were willing to form a new governmental 
coalition with the LDP in the Lower House. This meant that the defecting AMFC faced 
the risk of becoming a splinter party, like the New Liberal Club (hereafter, NLC).45 
Although, an opposition party joining a LDP-led coalition might split that particular 
opposition party, it is plausible that some sub-groups of the existing opposition parties 
were willing to split their party in order to have access to governmental power.  
3.3.4 Negative Case: 2000 Katō AMFC Non-factional Defection 
On 21 November 2000, 42 LDP AMFC legislators absent themselves from the 
no-confidence motion votes against the LDP. This is the one of the most significant 
political event after the 1993 LDP split because this is the most serious case of a break in 
                                                 
44 The trend of LDP’s declining seat share since the early 1970s and the improved relationship between the 
opposition parties facilitated the increased electoral cooperation among the opposition parties (Christensen 
2000, 98-9). 
45 The LDP’s Kōno Group defected to form the New Liberal Club (hereafter, NLC) in 1976. The NLC won 
17 Lower House seats in the 1976 Lower House election but dwindled to four seats in the 1979 Lower 
House election. It managed to improve its seat share to 12 but later dwindled again to eight in the 1983 
Lower House election and then 6 in the 1986 Lower House election. Finally, after ten years of struggle in 




party discipline that could have led to another major LDP split.46 The LDP’s Lower 
House seat share has steadily increased from a low of 43.6 percent in the 1993 Lower 
House election, 47.8 percent in the 1996 Lower House election, and 48.5 percent in the 
2000 Lower House election. LDP’s seat share increase was due mainly to the defections 
from the opposition parties. For instance, the LDP’s Lower House seats increased from 
233 seats in the 1993 Lower House election to 239 seats in the 1996 Lower House 
election, and further increased to 271 seats just before the 2000 Lower House election 
(table 3-12).47 
 
Table 3-12.  Evolution of LDP Lower House Seat Share (1993-2000) 
July 18 Oct 20 Jan 20 Sep 29 Apr 27 Jan 19 Oct 29 Dec 
28 
Apr 7 May 
26  
Jun 25 
1993 1996 1997 1997 1998 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2000 
election election                 election 
 
223 239 240 250 261 265 265 269 268 267 233 
Source: Kato and Yamamoto 2005, 13-14. 
 
The ruling coalition comprised the LDP, the Conservative Party and the CGP, 
which controlled 58.9 percent of Lower House seat share. In the inter-party arena, the 
LDP led coalition, with its strong Lower House majority, pushed through several highly 
controversial bills that included the reduction of the Lower House seats in February 2000 
and the reduction of the Upper House seats in September 2000 despite strong protests 
from the opposition parties. In the LDP’s intra-party arena, there was a division over the 
                                                 
46 This refers to the Hata factional defection and the Takemura Group defection. 





CGP as a coalition partner. The anti-LDP-CGP coalition was led by the YKK group 
(Yamazaki, Katō and Koizumi).48  
Mori Yoshirō took over the prime ministerial post after Obuchi Kezō’s death in 
April 2000. In the 2000 Lower House election held on 24 June 2000, the LDP coalition 
lost 60 seats vis-à-vis the opposition parties’ gain of 41 seats. A series of controversial 
remarks by Mori further reduced his cabinet’s popularity and threatened the LDP’s 
electoral performance in the 2001 Upper House election. Thus, Katō Kōichi, the leader of 
the second largest LDP faction and one of the future potential successors to Prime 
Minister Mori, decided to challenge Mori’s party presidency.49 Katō made a series of 
remarks directed against the Mori cabinet. Subsequently, on 10 November 2000, Katō 
indicated the Katō AMFC’s support for the no-confidence motion proposed by the 
opposition parties (Park 2001, 455). This case is almost similar to the 1980 case whereby 
the Fukuda AMFC legislators absent themselves from the no-confidence motion. The 
main difference between these two acts was that the no-confidence motion vote in 2000 
failed while the no-confidence motion vote in 1980 was passed. The no-confidence 
motion vote failed on 21 November 2000 with a 47-vote difference (table 3-13). Even if 
these 42 Katō AMFC legislators voted for the no-confidence motion, it would still fail 
but it could have been passed, if the Katō AMFC (with a total factional strength of 64 
                                                 
48 The YKK group was an informal group that was led by three key LDP legislators, Yamazaki Taku, Katō 
Kōichi and Koizumi Junichirō. The “YKK” came from the initial letter of the family names of the 
respective legislators. 
49 In the previous LDP party presidency race, Katō won 113 votes vis-à-vis Obuchi’s 350 votes. The other 





Lower House seats) did not have a factional split just before the 2000 no-confidence 
motion.50 
Table 3-13. Votes during the 2000 No-confidence Motion (21 November 2000) 
 
Number of Lower 
House  seats Vote for Vote Against Absent 
LDP and 
Coalition Partners 271 0 229 42 
Others 207 190 8 9 
Total 480 190 237 52 
Source: Asahi Shinbun, 21 November 2000. 
 
All the model’s propositions are validated. Proposition 1 is validated as the LDP’s 
absolute Lower House seats has decreased. This operationalization differs from the 
operationalization defined earlier in section 3.1.2. Despite the decreased seats, LDP’s seat 
share has increased because of the reduction of the Lower House seats from 500 seats in 
the 1996 Lower House election to 480 seats in the 2000 Lower House election. In the 
2000 Lower House election, the LDP’s seats was six seats lower than in the 1996 Lower 
House election but its seat share increased by 1.3 percent (table 3-14). Nevertheless, the 
seat share is 1.3 percent higher than in the 1996 Lower House election despite a decrease 
in number of seats. The LDP was the largest party of the three-party coalition (the LDP, 
48.5 percent, the CGP, 6.5 percent, and the Conservative Party, 1.5 percent) which had a 





                                                 
50 The original size of the AMFC was 64 (Katō faction was 45 and Yamazaki faction was 19). If the 64 of 
them voted for, the no-confidence motion would have been passed with 254 votes for the no-confidence 




Table 3-14.  Seat distribution in the Lower House 1996 and 2000 (% of Lower House Seat share) 
Party  1996 Lower House Election  June 2000 Lower House Election  
  Before After 
Ruling Coalition     
LDP 47.8 % 54.3% 48.5 % 
CGP NA 8.4% 6.5% 
New Conservative Party  NA 3.6% 1.5% 
Sub-total 47.8% 66.3% 56.5% 
    
Opposition Party     
NFP 31.2% NA NA 
DPJ 10.4% 19.0% 26.5% 
Liberal Party NA 3.6% 4.6% 
Reform Club NA 1.0% 0 
Social Democratic Party 3.0% 2.8% 4.0% 
JCP 5.2% 5.2% 4.2% 
Others 2.4% 2.0% 4.4% 
Sub-total 52.2 % 33.7% 43.5% 
Source: Thies (2002), 150. 
 
 Proposition 2 is not validated as there was no marginalized key faction. The LDP 
was divided between the MFC (comprising the Hashimoto faction, the Mori faction, the 
Eto-Kamei faction, the Komoto faction, and the Kōno group) led by the Mori faction and 
the AMFC (the Katō faction and the Yamazaki factions), led by the Katō faction. Katō 
Kōichi was the factional leader of the Katō faction (that was the second largest LDP 
faction).51 The MFC’s intra-party strength was 67.6 percent representation, a surplus 
factional coalition, while the AMFC’s intra-party strength was 24.6 percent 
representation (see table 3-15). Thus, the AMFC was not marginalized because if the 
largest faction, the Hashimoto faction (27.8 percent) joined the AMFC, their intra-party 
strength would be 52.4 percent representation while the MFC would dwindled to 39.8 
percent representation. The Hashimoto faction was the largest faction and any factional 
coalition that wishes to win the LDP party presidency needed this faction’s support (Park 
2001, 455).  
                                                 




Table 3-15. Representation of the Factional Coalition in the LDP in November 2000 (% LDP Strength) 
  MFC   AMFC Others
Hashimoto Mori Eto-Kamei Kōno group Komotō  Katō Yamazaki  
 
27.8 16.6 16.0 3.4 3.7  18.3 6.3 7.7 
Source: Kabashima Zemi 2000, 398-9; Tsuchiya 2000. 
 
 
Proposition 3 is not validated because there was no successful coordination efforts 
by the opposition parties between the June 2000 Lower House election and the November 
2000 no-confidence motion vote. This is due to two main factors. First, the opposition 
parties did not hold enough Lower House seats to pose a threat to LDP led coalition rule. 
The opposition parties held only 39.3 percent Lower House seat share (excluding the JCP) 
on the day of the no-confidence motion vote vis-à-vis the LDP coalition’s 56.5 percent 
(table 3-16).52 Thus, even if the CGP joined the DPJ led ruling coalition, the seat share 
will only be 45.8 percent vis-à-vis the LDP-New Conservative Party’s 50.0 percent. 
Second, the opposition parties were fragmented because the largest opposition party, the 
DPJ, failed to provide the opposition parties with leadership.53 The DPJ was not willing 
to cooperate with the other opposition parties in the 2000 Lower House election as it 
aimed to replace the LDP as the sole ruling party (Reed 2003, 50, 57; Uriu 1999, 142). 
Consequently, the opposition parties could not agreed on a common prime ministerial 
candidate (Asahi Shinbun, 18 November 2000). More importantly, the DPJ was also not 




                                                 
52 The DPJ had 26.5 percent, Liberal Party, 4.6 percent, and Social Democratic Party, 4.0 percent and other 
independent legislators, 4.4 percent. 




Table 3-16. Votes during the 2000 No-confidence Motion by Party 
 Lower House  seats Vote for Vote Against Absent 
Ruling Coalition      
LDP  234 0 192 42 
CGP 31 0 31 0 
Conservative Party  6 0 6 0 
Sub-Total 271 0 229 42 
     
Opposition Parties     
DPJ 127 127 0 0 
Liberal Party 22 22 0 0 
JCP 20 20 0 0 
Democratic Socialist Party 19 19 0 0 
Others 19 2 8 9 
Sub-Total 207 190 8 9 
Total 478 190 237 51 
Source: Asahi Shinbun, 21 November 2000. 
 
3.4 Findings and Discussion 
This section discusses the findings and implications of the empirical analyses in 
the previous section. All the model’s propositions are validated (table 3-17). A dominant 
party’s seat share does not have a definite impact on factional defection (proposition 1). 
The marginalization of the AMFC in the intra-party arena (proposition 2) and the 
expectation of reduced coordination failure with the opposition party in the inter-party 
arena cause factional defection (proposition 3).  
 
Table 3-17. Comparison between Positive and Negative Cases 
Propositions  Proposition 1 Proposition 2 Proposition 3 
Positive Cases     
Hatoyama AMFC (1953)  1 1 1 
Hata Faction (1993) 1 1 1 
    
Negative Cases     
Fukuda AMFC  (1980)  1 0 0 





Proposition 1 is validated in all the cases. Proposition 1 states that a dominant 
party faction is not necessarily more likely to defect when its dominant party’s relative 
Lower House seat share is smaller. The expected result was 1 for all the cases, without 
variance for the positive and the negative cases. In other words, a dominant party’s 
Lower House seat share is not a unique predictor of factional defection. This validation is 
counterintuitive and contradicts the extant wisdom of the relationship between party 
defection and seat share, namely, legislators will defect from a declining party (e.g., 
Harker 2003, 8; Mejía-Acosta 1999, 9), or legislators will defect from dominant party 
with a slim majority (e.g., Christensen 2000, 153; Cox and Rosenbluth 1995; Wolfe 1999, 
405).54 Based on the logic of the extant literature, there should be factional defection 
from the dominant party in the negative cases because the dominant party’s seat share has 
declined and it only held a slim Lower House majority. This, however, was not observed 
in the negative cases. The extant literature’s argument arises because the extant studies 
focus only on the inter-party arena thereby ignores the critical factional coalition 
dynamics in the intra-party arena. 
In the Japanese context, the main cause of this phenomenon is the presence of a 
pariah party and/or a pivotal party. In the Japanese party system, the JCP was the pariah 
party, that is, a party that will not be included in any forms of ruling coalition (Matoba 
1990, 100). Hypothetically, if the JCP seat share was added to the opposition party seat 
share, the opposition parties could possibly form an alternative majority government. 
This was the case especially during the 1979 and 1983 Lower House elections whereby 
the opposition parties (including the JCP) held 15 and 9 more seats than the LDP 
                                                 
54 This thesis does not argue that such studies only assume that the seat share of the dominant party 




respectively (table 3-18). In the light of this, although the LDP held seven, eight and 
seven seats lesser than the majority in the 1976 election, the 1979 election and the 1983 
election respectively, the opposition parties could not form an alternative ruling coalition 
in these two elections. This is because the Lower House seat difference between the LDP 
and the opposition parties (excluding the JCP) ranged from 16 to 26 seats.55  
 
Table 3-18: The JCP’s Role as a Pariah Party  
Election 
Year 
LDP’s seat share difference from 
majority 
LDP’s seat share difference from 
the opposition parties (excluding 
JCP) 
LDP’s seat share difference from 
the opposition parties (including 
JCP) 
1976 -7 26 7 
1979 -8 26 -15 
1983 -7 16 -9 
 
The next cause of the phenomenon is the CGP’s role as a pivotal party with its 
participation in the LDP led ruling coalition since 1999. The CGP’s Lower House seat 
share is critical for the LDP to maintain the ruling coalition’s majority. The CGP’s Lower 
House seat share has ranged from 8.4 percent (42 seats just before the June 2000 Lower 
House election) to 6.5 percent (31 seats after the June 2000 election). Based on the 1996, 
2000, and 2003 Lower House elections, there was a narrow gap between the LDP and the 
opposition parties (including the CGP) in terms of seat share, ranging from 0.6 percent 
(three seats) to 1.3 percent seat share (six seats) (table 3-19). Nevertheless, with the 
addition of the CGP to the LDP-led ruling coalition, the gap between the ruling coalition 
and the opposition parties increased to a larger seat share difference, ranging from 4.2 
percent (21 seats) to 9.2 percent seat share (44 seats). Thus, the CGP is critical in the 
formation of an alternative inter-party winning coalition to the LDP. 
 
                                                 
55 The JCP’s Lower House seat share increased from 1976 Lower House election’s 17 seats to 1979 Lower 




Table 3-19. The Relative Inter-party Strength between the Dominant Party  
and the Opposition Parties (1945-2003) 
Year of Election Variance 1 Variance 2 
1946 -94 -180 
1947 -103 -200 
1949 30 97 
1952 6 14 
1953 -35 -67 
1955 -49 -94 
1958 53 108 
1960 62 128 
1963 49 104 
1967 43 92 
1969 44 104 
1972 25 91 
1976 -7 26 
1979 -8 26 
1980 28 86 
1983 -7 16 
1986 43 115 
1990 19 54 
1993 -34 -50 
1996 -12 4 (21) 
2000 -8 6 (44) 
2003 -4 3 (41) 
Source: Ishikawa (2004) 222-234; Kitaoka 1995, 300.  
Date : Date of Lower House Election 
Variance 1 : Difference between  the LDP’s seat share from the simple 
majority of 50 percent  
Variance 2 : Difference between the LDP and the opposition parties’ seat 
share (excluding the JCP) 
( ) : Figures in bracket indicates the seat difference between the LDP 
coalition and the opposition parties 
 
Proposition 2 is validated in all the cases. Proposition 2 states that a dominant 
party faction is more likely to defect when some factions within the party are more 
marginalized in intra-party competition. The expected result was 1 for the positive case 
and 0 for the negative case. The AMFC in all the cases are marginalized in the positive 
cases and not marginalized for the negative cases. This proposition is not unique as other 
works have made similar arguments (e.g., Bettcher 2001; Boucek 2003). Although, intra-
party factors have also been cited a one the most common reason for a dominant party 




definitions like what this thesis has done (e.g., Brinegar, Morgenstern, and Nielson 2006; 
Mershon 2001; Reiter 2004). 
There are three points worth noting. First, factional divisions and/or factional 
splits occurred in factions that dissent (either defected or voiced). In the 1953 and 2000 
case, the AMFC factions, faced factional divisions that eventually led to a factional 
split.56 In contrast, the Hata faction faced factional division but did not experience a 
factional split. The Hata faction was divided into the pro-defection group (led by Ozawa 
Ichirō and Okuda Keiwa) and the anti-defection group (led by Watabe Kozo) just before 
the defection (Asahi Seiji-bu 1993, 40). Second, the nature of the intra-party factional 
competition structure determines whether a particular large faction is marginalized (see 
Reiter 2004, 256). Third, all the four cases involve a disgruntled key dominant party 
legislator who had grievances that arose from previous losses in the intra-party power 
struggle. These key dominant party legislators were fighting for the next party presidency. 
There was Hatoyama Ichirō in the 1953 case, Ozawa Ichirō in the 1993 case, Fukuda 
Takeo in the 1980 case, and Katō Kōichi in the 2000 case.57 
Proposition 3 is validated in all the cases. Proposition 3 states that a dominant 
party faction is more likely to defect when the chance of nominating a single alternative 
prime ministerial candidate is higher.. The expected result was 1 for the positive case and 
                                                 
56 In 1953, one of the AMFC factions, the Hatoyama faction, split into the pro-Hatoyama sub-faction and 
the pro-Andō sub-faction when it defected. In 2000, the Katō faction split into the pro-Katō Kōichi sub-
faction and the Koga sub-faction. 
57 For the 1953 case, Hatoyama Ichirō was supposed to be the Liberal Party’s party president after the 
Liberal Party won the 1946 Lower House election but he was later purged. For the 1993 case, Ozawa Ichirō 
was a key leader in the largest LDP faction, the Takeshita faction in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, Ozawa 
and his key ally, Hata Tsutomu split off from the Takeshita faction, the largest LDP faction, after Obuchi 
took over the Takeshita factional leadership. They formed the Hata faction and sought to win the LDP 
presidency. For the 1980 case, Fukuda Takeo was the LDP president from 1976 to 1978 and sought to 
continue his party presidency for the next round but was defeated in the LDP presidential election. For the 
2000 case, Katō Koichi was a factional leader of the second largest LDP faction and fared well in the 1999 
LDP presidential election. He was widely perceived to be the next LDP president. Nevertheless, the sudden 




0 for the negative case. This proposition is not novel and has been mentioned by various 
works. The common understanding is that for a defecting faction, the prospects of 
forming a new inter-party ruling coalition government with another party (or maybe 
merge with it) is the most important. In other words, “…the rebels had to believe that 
they would be better be able to attract other parties into governing” (Wolfe 1999, 402).” 
Similarly, Reiter (2004) argues that party defection will occur when the “programmatic 
proximity” of the faction with other parties in the inter-party arena (256). 
Proposition 3 is operationalized in two ways: either cooperation between the 
opposition parties and the AMFC in the prime ministerial election, cooperation in 
important Lower House votes, or an impending change in the rules of the game in the 
political arena. The opposition parties must overcome different coordination mechanisms 
according to circumstances. This indirectly explains the factional defection cases’ rare 
occurrence because changes in the rules of the games (e.g., the 1993 case) and legislative 
punishment motions (e.g., the 1953 case) occur rarely. This proposition can also be 
generalized to other party systems. For instance, Lin (2003) argues that the one of the key 
factors for the Taiwanese opposition party success against the ruling party is the 
expectation of cooperation in the upcoming presidential election.  
A possible counter-argument against proposition 3 is that the AMFC’s important 
consideration is the feasibility and sustainability of the anticipated inter-party coalition 
that it will form after its defection from the dominant party (Lupia and Strom 1995; 
Grofman and van Roozendaal 1997, 445; Wolfe 1999, 402). I argue that this it is unlikely 
to be the AMFC’s consideration because both the MFC and the AMFC have the incentive 




enjoy the spoils of power. Thus, no coalition options are more feasible than the existing 
rule by the dominant party. This is substantiated by the fact that despite numerous 
coalition proposals and electoral alliances by various opposition parties, most of such 
cooperation has not been realized. In short, one of the main windows of opportunity is the 
prime ministerial election 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed the empirical aspects of the thesis, that is, the research 
design and the narratives for the validation of the model. The use of the analytic narrative 
approach entails the forming of a falsifiable model and the use of narratives to validate it. 
The research design is the key link between these two critical components. This chapter 
has explained the research design by focusing on the rationale for a small N comparison, 
defining the key concepts of the relevant and irrelevant cases, and explaining the choice 
of variables and operationalization of the model’s three prepositions. The chapter’s key 
contribution is to address the key conceptual challenges of analyzing factional defection 
by defining the criterion for the differentiation between relevant and irrelevant cases for 
systematic comparison. Subsequently, it explains the operationalization of model’s 
propositions in details and its advantages and disadvantages over other methods of 
operationalization.  
The next main part of the chapter dealt with the empirical validation of the 
proposition. This chapter has validated the model’s three propositions with narratives 
based on the analytic narrative approach. Section 3.2 started by tracing the evolution of 




politics from 1945 to 2003. This provides the context for the empirical validation of the 
four cases. Subsequently, these cases were described in details with the justification for 
the validation of the model’s propositions. This thesis has provided valuable insights and 
fresh perspectives of these cases because with the exception of the 1993 Hata faction case, 
the other three case studies have not been analyzed systematically. Lastly, this thesis 
discussed briefly the significance of the findings by linking it with the broader literature. 
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Chapter 4       Conclusion 
 
This thesis aims to give a better model to analyze party defection in Japan and the 
initial test of the model using only cases from Japan suggests the usefulness of the model. 
The model complements the extant party defection literature thereby serves as a starting 
point to advance the ambitious project of developing a framework to explain party 
defection. Using a different unit of analysis, the faction, this thesis highlighted the 
previously overlooked empirical reality that party defections occur in different forms. The 
model depicts factions as strategic political actors actively and constantly in the lookout to 
improve their bargaining position in the inter-party arena and the intra-party arena. This 
thesis argues that factional defection from a dominant party occurs if key factions are 
marginalized in the inter-factional coalition game within the intra-party arena, and if they 
expect to win the future inter-party coalition game within the inter-party arena by forming 
a new ruling government with the opposition parties. During the process, this thesis also 
show that a dominant party’s seat share does not have a definite impact on the probability 
of a party defection occurring. While the thesis’ findings generally support the model, 
further testing of the model’s external validity and internal validity is needed. This chapter 
will discuss the limitations of the model and the avenues for future works. This thesis’ 
interesting findings provide new and interesting areas of research. 
 
4.1 External Validity: Extending the Generalizability of the Model  
This thesis has exchanged depth for breadth by using within nation comparison to 
tease out the causal mechanisms of party defection. This sacrifice for a large-N analysis 
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limits the model’s generalization. The way to increase N, is to conduct a cross-nation 
comparison in other parliamentary systems. The typology of party defection outlined in 
chapter 1 serves as a firm theoretical basis for future analyses of party defection (see 
figure 1-2). This is possible because of the presence of factionalized dominant parties that 
dominated their countries’ politics for decades, such as India’s National Congress Party 
(1949 - 1998), Israel’s Mapai (1948 - 1977), Italy’s DC (1946 - 1988), Sweden’s Social 
Democrats (1932 - 1976), Taiwan’s KMT (1949 - 2000), and Malaysia’s UMNO (1957 - 
present). Moreover, within these dominant party systems, there are a number of factional 
defection cases that have not been systematically analyzed. For instance, the Hau factional 
defection from Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) in 1993, the Razeleigh factional defection 
from Malaysia’s UMNO in 1990, and the Cárdenas factional defection from Mexico’s 
Partido Revoluncionario Institucional (PRI) in 1987. 
Two key factors must be considered in the application of the model. First, the 
different institutional aspects of the parliamentary system, especially the no-confidence 
motion and the prime ministerial election, must be factored in the application of the model. 
For example, there are laws in various parliamentary systems that discourage party 
defection. In Thailand, according to the 1997 Constitution, a legislator is not allowed to 
run for elections under the new party label if he or she defects from the party within 90 
days from the election day (Rüland Jürgen et al. 2005, 198-9).  
Second, the model’s application in presidential party systems whereby political 
parties compete in the legislative and the presidential elections simultaneously. The 
executive powers and the legislative powers are fused in a parliamentary system but they 
are separated in a presidential party system. The two separate arenas may impose different 
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political incentives for legislators contemplating defection. For instance, the nation’s 
president may play a great role in shaping the intra-party and inter-party coalition politics 
as in Brazil (Amorim Neto and Fabiano Santos 2001) and Ecuador (Mejía-Acosta 2004). 
Moreover, one of the key institutions in the presidential party system is the presidential 
election at the national level whereby the opposition parties can directly challenge the 
dominant party by nominating a common presidential candidate. For instance, the 
dominant parties in a few countries (e.g., Taiwan’s KMT and Mexico’s PRI) lost power 
because of their loss in the presidential election. This loss later affected the dominant 
party’s performance in the subsequent legislative election. Taiwan’s KMT first lost the 
presidential election in 2000 followed the legislative election in 2001, thereby losing its 
dominant party status within a span of two years.  
 
4.2 Internal Validity: Further Refinement of the Model 
This thesis uses a game theoretic model to explain factional defection. The model 
has systematically linked the black box of intra-party politics with the inter-party politics. 
Game theory remains the main way forward to further develop the understanding of party 
defection. There are three main approaches to improve the model, to change the model’s 
assumption of unitary office-seeking factions, to increase the number of strategic options 
available to the actors, and improve the model to account for different types of non-
factional defection. 
4.2.1 The Assumption of faction as a Unitary Office-seeking Actor 
First, future works may seek to refine the assumption of the faction as a unitary 
actor because this assumption does not match with empirical reality. Most of the works 
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that use factions as a dependent variable or an independent variable often assumes faction 
as unitary and office-seeking (Bouissou 2001; Druckman 1996; Leiserson 1968). 
Nevertheless, factions are often divided into sub-factions as there are divisions on policies 
and distribution of office benefits within the factions (Itō 1997; Reed 1991; Richardson 
1997, 52-55). As shown in the four cases, all the key AMFC factions were divided in the 
process of dissent. On the one hand, the factions in the AMFC in the 1953 case and the 
2000 case eventually split into two factions.109 On the other hand, factions in the 1980 
case and the 1993 cases remained intact although they were divided during the no-
confidence motion vote. The strategic calculations of the sub-factions are important 
because if a significant number of factional members does not want to defect, the 
defecting faction’s size might be reduced thereby lower its bargaining power in the 
legislature. One of the ways to analyze factional defection using sub-faction as the unit of 
analysis, is to use a two level game by linking with the inter-party and intra-party arena 
(encompassing inter-factional and intra-factional arenas). This will best depict the inter-
factional and intra-factional coalition dynamics.  
The alternative way to modify the assumption is to examine the dynamic 
interaction between the individual incentive and the group incentive (see Giavous and 
Mizrahi 1999; Harker 2003, 7; Hausken 1995). While this thesis focuses on the group 
incentive and the extant literature focuses on the individual incentive, in reality, the 
decision to defect is based on a combination of individual incentive and group incentive. 
The group incentive is critical as the individual legislator needs to be sure that the group 
which she belongs to will aid her political survival in the near future. On the one hand, a 
                                                 
109 In the 1953 case, the Hatoyama faction was split into the pro-Hatoyama fa and the pro-Ando faction. In 
the 2000 case, the Katō faction was split into the pro-Katō faction (led by the factional leader, Katō Koichi) 
and the anti-Katō faction (led by a key leader, Horiuchi Mitsuo) in the 2000 no-confidence vote. 
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group of legislators is more likely to defect if there was a leader among them who can 
promise them the likelihood of political success after defecting from the party (Wolfe 
2003, 405). On the other hand, the individual legislator must also be confident of her re-
election success and the continued support of her supporters if she changes her party label. 
Second, future works may combine the office-seeking and the policy-seeking 
dimension of factions to make the unit of analysis more robust. The extant literature 
focuses on either faction as office-seeking (e.g., Bouissou 2001) or faction as policy-
seeking (e.g., Mule 2002). Using individual legislator as the unit of analysis, Reed and 
Scheiner (2003) argues that electoral (concern for re-election) and policy (concern for 
political reforms) are the two key independent variables that cause party defection. 
Although, LDP factions have certain policy orientations (McCubbins and Thies 1997; 
Yoda 1985) more work needs to be done to establish the causal effects on party defection. 
4.2.2 Increasing the Actors’ Strategic Choices  
The second approach is to improve the model is to increase the actors’ strategic 
choices. The model posits that the AMFC has only two strategic choices: exit (factional 
defection) or stay (non-factional defection). Nevertheless, in reality, an actor has more 
than just two choices. By focusing on the defectors’ post-defection fates, the model may 
be improved by depicting the actors’ strategic choice of exit in terms of starting a new 
party (fission), joining existing parties (party switch), the merging of different parties to 
form a new party (fusion), or to simply remain as an independent legislator (Desposato 
2006; Kreuzer and Pettai 2003, 78). Moreover, future work should focus on a puzzling 
phenomenon whereby fission is a much preferred type of party defection than party switch 
for both factional defection and group defection. The incorporation of multiple choices 
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will enhance the predictive powers of the model. Table 2-2 in chapter 2 highlighted that if 
a faction defects from a party, it does not join another party but only form a new party 
while a group that defects from a party can either join another party or form a new party. 
In Japan, from 1945 to 2003, there was no factional switching but with six cases factional 
fission while there was only two cases of group switch and nine cases groups fission. 
Future work should carry out empirical analyses of this phenomenon with more cases.  
4.2.3 Improving the Model to for Non-dominant party Defection 
and Non-factional Defection  
Third, this thesis’ model only explains factional defection from the dominant party 
hence not able to explain defections in other forms such as group defection. Future works 
may improve the model by extending it to other categories of party defection like 
factional defection, group defection or individual defection (see figure 1-2). This promises 
exciting results as there are more cases for empirical validation. Legislators are more 
likely to defect from an opposition party than a ruling party as the ruling party hold the 
reins of power and is in a better position to distribute office benefits. In Japan, group 
defection occurred more frequently than factional defection between 1945 and 2003. 
There were six factional defection cases from dominant parties and non-dominant ruling 
parties and eleven group defection cases (see table 3-3).  
Two of the group defection cases, the defection of the Kōno Group and the 
Takemura Group, has been written extensively.110 For instance, the common explanation 
for the motivations of the Takemura Group defection is the disagreement with the LDP’s 
stance on political reform (e.g., Asahi Seiji-bu 1993, 51-54; Wolfe 1995; Yomiuri Seiji-bu 
                                                 
110 The LDP’s Kōno Group defected to form the New Liberal Club in 1976 while the Takemura Group 
defected to form the New Party Harbinger in 1993. 
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1993, 101-6). This explanation is insufficient, as it cannot explain why the Takemura 
Group defected in June 1993 but not earlier during the course of LDP’s political reform 
debate that started since the late 1980s. Moreover, the Takemura Group comprises 
members from different factions hence a puzzle arises: why did the Takemura Group 
members not follow their larger faction but rather take a big risk to form a small party in 
the inter-party arena, given that a small party cannot survive easily in the Japanese 
legislature as demonstrated by past cases. Future works should analyze the interaction 
between the individual legislator’s incentive and the group incentive (the Takemura 
Group’s incentive and the factional incentive of the factions, which the Takemura Group 
legislators belong to). 
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DETAILS OF NO-CONFIDENCE MOTIONS IN POST WAR JAPAN (1945-2003) 
PM Proposed Voted Decision Note 
Yoshida  1948/11/16    Held in HMC (11/18) and no vote taken 
 1948/12/13 1948/12/13 1 The Diet dissolved (12/23) 
 1950/04/30 1950/05/01 0   
 1950/04/30    No vote taken because of the rejection of the other motion 
 1951/08/17    Deliberation unfinished 
 1952/06/25 1952/06/26 0   
 1952/06/14    No vote taken because of the rejection of the other motion 
 1953/03/13 1953/03/14 1 The Diet dissolved because of cabinet resignation 
 1954/04/22 1954/04/24 0   
 1954/04/22    No vote taken because of the rejection of the other motion 
 1954/04/24    No vote taken because of the rejection of the other motion 
 1954/12/06    No deliberation because of cabinet resignation 
Hatoyama  1956/05/31 1956/06/01 0 A confidence motion proposed (4/29) but 
withdrawn (5/1) 
Kishi 1957/05/16 1957/05/17 0   
  1958/05/24    No vote taken because of Diet Dissolution 
(4/25) 
  1959/03/27 1959/03/28 0   
Ikeda 1961/06/07    Deliberation unfinished 
  1964/06/23 1964/06/24 0   
Sato 1966/05/14 1966/05/14 0   
  1967/08/07 1967/08/07 0   
  1969/07/29 1969/07/30 0   
  1971/12/23 1971/12/24 0   
  1972/06/15 1972/06/15 0   
Tanaka 1973/09/22 1973/09/22 0   
  1974/07/31 1974/07/31 0   
Miki 1975/07/02 1975/07/03 0   
  1975/12/18 1975/12/19 0   
  1976/11/04    Deliberation unfinished 
Ōhira 1979/09/07    No vote taken because of Diet Dissolution (9/7) 
  1980/05/16 1980/05/16 1 The Diet dissolved (5/16) 
Suzuki 1982/08/17 1982/08/18 0   
Nakasone 1983/05/24 1983/05/24 0   
  1983/11/28    No vote taken because of Diet Dissolution 
(11/28) 
Takeshita 1988/12/22 1988/12/23 0   
Miyazawa 1992/06/13    Deliberation unfinished. A confidence motion 
propose (6/12) and passed (6/14) 
    147
  1993/06/17 1993/06/18 1 The Diet dissolved (6/18) 
Hata 1994/06/23    No deliberation because of cabinet resignation 
Murayama 1995/06/12 1995/06/13 0   
Hashimoto 1997/12/11 1997/12/11 0   
  1998/06/11 1998/06/12 0   
Obuchi 1999/08/10 1999/08/11 0   
Mori 2000/05/31    Deliberation unfinished 
  2000/11/20 2000/11/21 0   
  2001/03/05 2001/03/05 0   
Koizumi 2002/07/30 2002/07/30 0   
  2003/07/25 2003/07/25 0   
Source: Masuyama and Nyblade 2003, 20-1. 
 
PM: Name of the cabinet. 
Proposed: The date the motion was proposed 
Voted: The date the motion was voted 
Decision: The result of the vote (1: Passed; 0: Not passed) 
 
 
